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Abstract 
The purpose for this dissertation is to study factors that inhibit and promote the 
implementation of Safety Management System (SMS) in aviation. To gain insight into the 
subject, an extensive literature review has been made. Using the literature review, I have 
identified a set of factors that inhibit and promote SMS implementation. A model for analysis 
and questionnaire was constructed based on these factors. 
The question posed for the study is; what inhibits and promotes the implementation of System 
Management Systems (SMS) in aviation? The approach applied in the study is Complexity 
System Theory. 
The findings show that 'Safety Leadership' and 'Safety Culture' are regarded as the most 
important promoters for SMS implementation. From a scale from 1-5, the average score for 
'Safety Leadership' is 4,8 and 4,7 for 'Safety Culture'. Interesting is that Software management 
with the average score of 3. This indicates that either the respondents were uncertain about the 
question or the importance of Software management as a promoting factor in SMS 
implementation. Among the inhibiting factors, the average score for both 'Quality Data and 
Information' and 'Human Factors' was 4,2. The interesting result is that among the ranking of 
inhibiting factors, 'Resources' was not rated as the most important inhibitor. The average score 
for 'Resources' was 4,1. However, the difference is very small. 'Software Knowledge' had the 
lowest average score of 3, among the restraining factors. This indicates that either the respondents 
were uncertain about the question or the importance of 'Software Knowledge' as a inhibiting 
factor in SMS implementation. 
The dissertation recommends that the inhibiting factors should be reasonable targeted. These 
factors have to be attended to since they can seriously affect the implementation of Safety 
Management System. However, the important enablers such as 'Safety leadership' and 'Safety 
Culture' must be taken seriously. Furthermore, a continuous development and monitoring of 
the strategic enabling factors are essential. This is important, since the promoting factors also 
by time need to adapt to the changes in the system, and they can easily be come inhibitors. 
Keywords: Safety Management System (SMS), safety, system, complexity and systems, risk 
management, safety-centric 
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Summary 
The study is on Safety Management System implementation (SMS). The background to the 
study is that in 2006, the International Civil A viation Organization (ICAO), signed out the 
international standard for Safety Management Systems in aviation. The organization also 
mandated that its entire member states to implement Safety Management System programs in 
their aviation industries by 2009. Currently, only a few countries can flag that they have 
implemented at a nationallevel. 
The question posed for the study is; what inhibits and promotes the implementation of System 
Management Systems (SMS) in aviation? 
Based on the literature review, enabling and inhibiting factors were selected for the study. I 
constructed a model for analysis related to the question, theory and the literature review. The 
model is holistic, and I believe my contribution to existing research is a holistic approach to 
safety system studies. The approach applied in the study is Complexity System Theory. 
The findings show that 'Safety Leadership' and 'Safety Culture' are regarded as the most 
important promoters for SMS implementation. From a scale from 1-5, the average score for 
'Safety Leadership' is 4,8 and 4,7 for 'Safety Culture'. Interesting is that Software management 
with the average score of 3. This indicates that either the respondents were uncertain about the 
question or the importance of Software management as a promoting factor in SMS 
implementation. Among the inhibiting factors, the average score for both 'Quality Data and 
Information' and 'Human Factors' was 4,2. The interesting result is that among the ranking of 
inhibiting factors, 'Resources' was not rated as the most important inhibitor. The average score 
for 'Resources' was 4,1. However, the difference is very small. 'Software Knowlegde' had the 
lowest average score of 3, among the restraining factors. This indicates that either the respondents 
were uncertain about the question or the importance of 'Software Knowlegde' as a inhibiting 
factor in SMS implementation. 
The dissertation recommends that the inhibiting factors should be reasonable targeted. These 
factors have to be attended to since they can seriously affect the implementation of Safety 
Management System. However, the important enablers such as 'Safety leadership' and 'Safety 
Culture' must be taken seriously. Furthermore, a continuous development and monitoring of 
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the strategic enabling factors are essential. This is important, since the promoting factors also 
by time ne ed to adapt to the changes in the system, and they can easily become inhibitors. 
Future studies may include: 
Performing such a survey on a larger population or among organization is 
recommended. 
Longitudinal studies for countries and organizations that have not yet implemented 
SMS can be fruitful in the long run. It will then be a better performance indicator. 
Content analysis on the websites such as LinkedIn could present some interesting 
results 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
"Business first - safety always," is on how to go about business in aviation industry in the 
21st century, through safety management systems. The statement and motto may sound 
controversial, especially in the aviation industry where safety is paramount. However, it is no 
secret that the main purpose for a commercial airline operation is to make money. Thus, 
safety comes along in the proeess. But this is not always the case. Safety is often considered 
separate from the company proeess and regarded as an added cost. 
Safety is often spoken of as the first priority. An example is like in the European Commission 
press release on blacklisted operators, a statement made by Commission Vice-President Siim 
Kallas, responsible for transport, that stated: 
"The Commission is ready to spare no effort to assist its neighbors in building their 
technical and administrative capacity to overcome any difficulties in the area of safety 
as quickly and as efficiently as possible. In the meantime, safety comes first. We 
cannot afford any comprornise in this area. Where we have evidence inside or outside 
the European Union that air carriers are not performing safe operations we must act to 
exclude any risks to safety" (Europa, 2011). 
In 2006, the International Civil A viation Organization (ICAO), signed out the international 
standard for Safety Management Systems in aviation. The organization also mandated that its 
entire member states to implement Safety Management System programs in their aviation 
industries by 2009 (ICAO, 2009). 
Currently, only a few countries can flag that they have implemented according to ICAO 
standards and guide lines. These are countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand that 
have engaged in SMS in aviation for a few years now. According to Stolzer et al, it's just now 
emerging in the United States, and is non-existent in most other countries (Stolzer et al 2010). 
It has only recently been implemented in the United Kingdom (UK), and Norway is among 
the countries that have not implemented SMS yet. 
There is so far some confusion concerning Safety Management Systems in aviation. And 
there are already severai interpretations of what SMS is and who it is intended for. 
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Furthermore, how it should be implemented or even organized. As William R. Voss, President 
and CEO at Flight Safety Foundation, argues on why SMS needs to be reconsidered: 
"We also knew that all these consultants couldn't possibly know much about the 
subject and would be forced to regurgitate the ICAO guidance material that was being 
put out. It was obvious that the process people dealing with ISO and QMS would 
embrace the concept of SMS and treat it as another process exercise. It was clear that 
the regulators were going to have a very hard time evaluating an SMS and would 
reduce the concept to a series of checklists. All of those predictions have come true, 
so it is time to take a honest look at where we are and where we are going from here. 
The ICAO guideline was built around "four pillars" so now everybody has an SMS 
with four pillars. And of course, now every regulator has a checklist that counts the 
pillars. We have policies, posters, forms, processes and meetings. This is all really 
very comforting to people who have never grasped the concept of risk management" 
(Areospace World p. 1,2012) 
The airline industry is very complex and global business has never been more challenging and 
unpredictable. Therefore; knowledge and understanding of risk management are essential to 
get a better grip ofwhat SMS is all about and working with it effectively. Hubbard (2009), 
however, argues about how uncritical use of risk analysis and management is a risky business 
itself. He is concerned about the different approaches to risk management and how risk 
analyses are performed. 
1.2 Background 
There has been a growing interest for SMS since ICAO mandated that its entire member states 
to implement SMS programs. The situation is that the implementation status varies a lot 
among different countries and among continents. However, there is evidence that there is 
great interest on the subject, based on the ongoing activities on the Internet. The specialized 
websites such as LinkedIn contain much of the contemporary debate on the subject. There are 
also a few blogs covering the development in the subject and issue. Many of the contents on 
these internet sites, however, need to be carefully scrutinized for their sources and validity, 
before accepting these comments and opinions as actually correct. That said; these websites 
are valuable sources indeed for monitoring the current issues and state of the debate. Since 
they provide: 
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individual experiences relevant for the subject 
personal interpretations and questions on issues in the subject 
expert comments and answers 
personal convictions 
However, like in many debate forums and channeis. There is a tendency of a few who tend to 
dominate the discussion. This is also the case here. The advantage is while they on the one 
hand keep the debate alive. The disadvantage is that they tend to limit the depth of the debate. 
The contemporary debates on the websites and the official documents have been use to 
analyzed what inhibit and prornote SMS in aviation, in my attempt, to fill the gap in the 
existing research. 
Safety management in aviation has a long history. The same applies to different method of 
risk assessments and methods. It is important that SMS should be conceptualized as a change 
in safety risk management. Without understanding what the changes imply, one would be 
missing the whole point. 
Contributions from this research effort should support efforts in organizations on how they 
implement and developed their SMS and the authorities on information and communications. 
1.3 Purpose of the dissertation 
The purpose for this dissertation is to study factors that inhibit and prornote the 
implementation of Safety Management System (SMS) in aviation. To gain insight into the 
subject, an extensive literature review has been made. 
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1.4 Problem formulation 
Severai issues brought my interest to try to understand what Safety Management System 
(SMS) in aviation was all about. 
1) As mentioned earlier, in 2006, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
signed out the international standard for Safety Management Systems in aviation. The 
organization also mandated that its entire member states to implement Safety Management 
System programs in their aviation industries by 2009 (ICAO, 2009). The second vers ion of 
the Safety Management Manual (SMM), was published in 2009 and yet by 2012, many 
countries, including Norway had not a State Safety Program (SSP). The SSP is the national 
safety document that each civil aviation authority is to develop for implementing and 
monitoring of SMS. Questions that came to my mind were. Why is it taking so long, what is 
in the way, why is it difficult to implement, why is it that only a few countries have to manage 
to implement it? 
2) The second issue that came to my mind was. Why is SMS a new concept in aviation? 
Commercial airline at least in the western countries, is known for its records and as the safe st 
means of transportation. As Stolzer et al (2010) writes, SMS is already found in a wide 
variety of industries, such as chemical, oil, construction, occupational, food, highway, 
electrical, and others. The question is then, why has SMS not been implemented earlier in 
aviation? Hasn't there been a need? I should point out that, what exists and is applied today, is 
what is referred to as safety programs. 
So why is the situation as it is today? Is it possible to identify factors that restrain or enable 
the implementation of SMS in aviation? 
The main question in the dissertation is, therefore, what inhibits and promotes the 
implementation of System Management Systems (SMS) in aviation? 
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1.5 Limitation and scope 
The dissertation is limited to issues related to implementation of SMS. 
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 1: Introduction, background and purpose of the research topic. 
Chapter 2: Theory, Definitions and concepts 
Chapter 3: The literature review 
Chapter 4: Promoting and inhibiting factors in system safety programs 
Chapter 5: Methodology 
Chapter 6: Data and analysis 
Chapter 7: Phased approached strategy for implementing SMS 
Chapter 8: Discussion 
Chapter 9: Summary and further studies 
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Chapter 2 Theory, Definitions and Concepts 
In this chapter I intend to present the theory chosen for my dissertation. I will also present 
some definitions that relate to the topic I have chosen. These are concepts and terminologies 
that I believe will give the reader a good introduction and perspective on the subject. 
Personally, I have used this chapter as a guideline for writing this dissertation. Furthermore, it 
has improved and has broadens my knowledge in Complexity systems and system safety 
research. 
2.1 Theory 
The approach I am taking in the dissertation is based on complex systems theory. According 
to Lichtenstein, it originates from Prigogine's research on "dissipative structures," which 
"explains how regimes of order come into being and retain their form amidst a constant 
dissipation of energy and resources" (Prigogine, 1955, in Lichtenstein 2007, p. 288). The idea 
became popularized in the 1960s and 1970s by von Bertalanffy's formulation of General 
Systems Theory (von Bertalany, 1968, in Lichtenstein, 2007). Today, it is known as 
complexityand systems theory (Dekker, 2011). 
According Lichtenstein, at its essence, complexity researchers are providing new ways to 
understand how and why order emerges. Lichtenstein explains that formally, emergence has 
been defined in terms of "qualitative novelty" , and the focus was on the creation of coherent 
structures in a dynamic system. He continues that, "when these emergent structures are 
different "in kind" from the elements that compose them - when a new "level" of order has 
come into being, or a pattem of activity can be discemed that in some way transcends but 
includes the elements of the system, emergence can be said to have occurred" (Lichtenstein 
2007, p. 288). Thus, emergence is a process by which " ... pattems or global-Ievel structures 
arise from interactive local-level processes ... [The] combination of elements with one another 
brings with it something that was not there before" (Mead, 1932, in Lichtenstein, 2007 p. 
289). 
Schwandt and Szabla (2007) have categorized systems discourse into three periods: 
1900-1940 Work Systems to Cooperative Systems 
1940- 1970 Functionally Driven Systems to Interactive Systems 
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1970-2000 Leaming Systems to Complex Systems 
The period from 1900-1940, 
The concept of systems began its movement away from the mechanical and formalized 
reductionary application of systems theory to a functional analysis of the social system. The 
discourse is characterized by the control of production of materials and products and the need 
to structure a workforce in an industrial age that could provide the labor requirements for a 
growing population and economy. The shift in the social systems discourse acknowledge the 
need for a more complex treatment of the system's influence on people, and the people's 
influence on the system. Toward the end ofthis time period, the focus began to be placed on 
the nature of the relationships between the elements of the system in order to maintain the 
system's stability or equilibrium. "The elements ofthe system were no longer just the workers 
and the work; they became the roles of the worker and management in hierarchical structures 
(Weber, 1930, in Schwandt and Szabla 2007 p. 43), 
Schwandt and Szabla (2007), describe that the early discourse on social systems indicate the 
beginning of a shift away from purely objective and reductionary ideology that accompanied 
the migration of systems theory from the hard sciences to the social sciences. It their view, 
this was the beginning of an understanding that efficiency was dependent, not only on the 
rational control processes imposed on elements (people), but also on the mutual action of the 
elements under social conditions (role definitions) and a set of societal standards that guided 
the choice ofthe individuals (norms). 
The period from 1940-1970 
Two streams of the system discourse provide for the evolution of thinking along different 
courses. The first stream assumed that it is the internal system' s actions that maintain a 
balance with the system's environment. Theses action would provide the system with the 
capacity to adapt to any disturbance in the environment (import needed energy), achieve 
system' s goals, integrate itself (coordinate and control the actions to achieve goals), and 
maintain a set of cultural patterns to support the value and norms of the collective (Parsons 
and Shills, 1952, in Schwandt and Szabla 2007 p. 48). 
The second stream ofinfluence on the discource resulted from the introduction of 
computational sciences to the understanding of social communications (Wiener, 1948, in ibid, 
43). Schwandt and Szabla, meant this emphasized the need for information in the form of 
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feedback so that the system could maintain a homeostasis state. The introduction of 
"cybemetics" as a conceptual analytical frame focused on the responsiveness of the system to 
forces in the environment that were responsible for the deviations from intended outcomes (as 
opposed to equilibrium (Buckley, 1967, in ibid p. 48). According to Schwandt and Szaba, the 
role of system' s structure was to provide for control of information flow and distribution, the 
scanning of the environment for required information, the selection of sources of information, 
and the importation of information as a source of energy to combat entropy (the disordering 
and eventual death of the system). 
The introduction of the concept of complexity and the loss of the perceived ability to control 
and predict sodal dynamics provided a critical turning point in the discourse conceming 
sodal systems. The emphasis became increased variety as opposed to suppression, or control, 
of variety (ibid) 
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Adapted and modified from Schwandt and Szabla (2007 p. 56) 
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The period from 1970-2000 
Schwandt and Szabla (2007) explains that this time period did not see an end of 
functionalism, rather it saw its argumentation with concepts of information control, 
knowledge utilization (rational contingent decision-making, strategic thinking, and eventually 
organizationallearning), and a reemphasis of the individual's interpretative influence on 
social systems structures. Social systems discourse incorporated three major concepts that 
again moved away from psychological security of reductionism: self generation, learning and 
complexity. 
Buckley (1968) described that self-generation reflected the realization that social structures 
was emergent and regenerative stemming from reciprocal and ongoing social interactions (in 
Schwandt and Szabla, 2007). Giddens's (1984) theory of the structuration described the dual 
nature of the agents altering the social structure - guiding the actions of the agents, and the 
actions of the agents altering the structure (in ibid). This is just a short presentation oftwo 
main contributors to the first stream of the social system discourse during this period. 
Harbermas, Luhmann are among others who have contributed during the period, but their 
theories won't be presented here. Although, I can mention that their theories have also 
contributed greatly to development in Communication and Language studies. 
Schwandt and Szabla (2007) describes that the sec ond stream of social discourse emanated 
from the conceptualization of social systems as, not only having goals of production, but also 
being driven by goals of knowledge creation through learning. In this discourse, "in which 
neg-entropy (or energy) is critical to the system's survival" (Baliley, 1994, in Schwandt and 
Szabla, 2007 p. 52) 
According to Schwandt and Szaba (2007), the third stream of social system discourse reflects 
a merger of cybernetics, organizationallearning, complexity science and the dynamics of 
social interaction. Emergence and tension have be come major concepts in understanding 
structure and leadership. "Emergence can be thought of as the evolution and recombination of 
interations into new actions"(Anderson, 1999, in Schwandt and Szaba p. 53). This is a 
reflection of Giddens 's structuration theory in that it assumes that structure is multifaceted 
and is ever changing itself. 
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Presented above is the development in discourses or theories that have led to what complex 
systems theory is today. One can see that it embodies many different disciplines. 
Dekker (2011) has summarized complexity and systems theory as follows. 
o Complex systems are open systems - open to influences from the environment 
in which they operate and influencing that environment in retum. Such 
openness means that it is difficult to frame the boundaries around a system of 
interest. 
o In a complex system, each component is ignorant of the behavior of the system 
as a whole, and doesn't know the full effects of its actions either. Components 
respond locally to information presented by them there and then. Complexity 
arises from the huge, multiplied webs of relationships and interactions that 
result from these Iocal actions. 
o Complexity is a feature of the system, not of the components inside it. The 
knowledge of each component is limited and Iocal, and there is no component 
that possesses enough capacity to represent the complexity of the entire system 
in that itself. This is why the behavior of the system cannot be reduced to the 
behavior of the constituent components, but only characterized on the basis of 
the multitude of ever-changing relationships between them. 
o Complex systems operate under conditions far from the equilibrium. Inputs 
need to be made the whole time by its components in order to keep it 
functioning. Without that constant flow of actions, of inputs, it cannot survive 
in a changing environment. The performance of complex systems is typically 
optimized at the edge of chaos, just before system behavior will be come 
unrecognizably turbulent. 
o Complex systems have a history, a path-dependence. Their past is co-
responsible for their present behavior, and descriptions of complexity have to 
take history into account. 
o Interactions in the complex systems are non-linear. That means that there is an 
asymmetry between for example, input and output, and that small events can 
produee large results. The existence of feedback loops means that complex 
systems can contain multipliers (where more of the one means more of the 
other, in turn leading to more of one, and so forth) and butterfly effects. 
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2.2 Safety 
Safety means different things to different people (Stolzer et al, 2002). Despite the universal 
agreement that safety is important, there is no unequivocal definition ofwhat safety is. Most 
people, practitioners and researchers alike, may nevertheless accept a definition of safety as 
'the freedom from unacceptable risks' as a good starting point (Hollnagel, 2009). 
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Figure 2.2: Definition of safety 
Source: (Hollnagel, 2009 p. 9). 
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This definition can be operationalised by representing an accident as the combination of an 
unexpected event and the lack of protection or defence as depicted in the figure above (figure 
2.1). According to Hollnagel, this rendering suggests that safety can be achieved in three 
different ways: by eliminating the risk, by preventing unexpected events from taking place, 
and by protecting against unexpected outcomes when they happen anyway. Hollagel argues 
that, although the definition of safety given in Figure 2.1 looks simple, it raises a number of 
significant questions for any safetyeffort. The three main questions are: 
l) What the risks are and how they can be found, i.e., about what can go wrong? 
2) How the freedom from risk can be achieved, i.e, what means are available to 
prevent unexpected events or to protect against unwanted outcomes? 
3) The third question has two parts, namely how much risk is acceptable and how 
much risk is affordable. 
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Hollnagel points out that answering these questions is rarely easy and emphases that without 
having at least tried to answer them, efforts to bring about safety are unlikely to be successful 
(Hollnagel, 2009). 
Hollnagel's description of 'risk elimination' needs further elaboration since it does not clearly 
explain how the process of risk management functions in practice. We take risks (into 
account) according to the probability and magnitude ofinjury or loss. Risk managers look at 
all sources and scenarios of risks and calculate their likelihood of occurrence and the costs 
that they may incur. Once this task has been accomplished, the organization is presented with 
a set of options: 
· Risk Avoidance (eliminate the source of risk or avoid actions that may result in such risk) 
· Risk Reduction (put in resources or take actions that reduces the amount of risk involved) 
· Risk Transfer (share the risk with others, insure against it or outsource it) 
· Risk Tolerance (accept the consequences and budget/prepare for it) (Supervison notes: 
Strømmen-Bakhtiar) 
Safety is defined by ICAO as "the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or 
property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a 
continuing process ofhazard identification and safety risk management" (ICAO 2009, P 2-2). 
A term that is included in the ICAO's definition of safety that needs further explanation is 
hazard identification. ICAO define hazard as " a condition or an object with the potential to 
cause injuries to personnel, damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction 
of ability to perform a prescribed function" (ICAO 2009, p 4-1). Behind this view is that, 
systems in which people must actively and closely interact with technology to achieve 
production goals through delivery of services are known as socio-technical systems. All 
aviation organizations are thus socio-technical systems. Hazards are normal components or 
elements of socio-technical systems. They are integral to the contexts where delivery of 
services by socio-technical production systems takes place. In and by themselves, hazards are 
not "bad things". Hazards are not necessarily damaging or negative components of a system. 
It is only when hazards interface with the operations of the system aimed at service delivery 
that their damaging potential may become a safety concem. 
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What does hazard identification mean then in this context? Hazards are part of the fabric of 
any socio-technical production system implies that the scope of hazards in aviation is wide. 
Hazard identification then involves the scope of factors and processes that should be looked 
into (ICAO, 2009, p. 4-4). 
ICAO's safety definition is based on the concept that "safety is viewed as the outcome of the 
management of certain organizational processes, which have the objective to keeping safety 
risk of the consequences of hazards in operational contexts under organizational control" 
(ICAO, 2009, p. 2-2). According to Stolzer et al, the ICAO definition relates to safety 
management since it recognizes that the risk in activity is not reduced to zero, but rather to an 
acceptable level. Furthermore, it explains that safety is maintained by a process and that 
process involves identifying the hazards that impede safety, and managing risks (Stolzer et al, 
2010). 
2.3 Management 
Agenerally accepted definition is that management is the process of getting activities 
completed efficiently and effectively with and through other people. The functions normally 
associated with management are planning, organizing, staffing, directing, controlling and 
budgeting. Management is leading and directing an organization or an activity through the 
deployment and manipulation of resources, whether the resources are human, financial, 
intellectual, material or other (Stolzer et al, 20 l O) 
There is already extensive literature on management. Therefore, the definition does not need 
further explanation here. However, more discussion on management will be done, when 
discussing challenges related to safety leadership later. 
2.4 System 
In the section on system discourse and its development, I did not present the definitions of a 
system or was it discussed. In this section I will present severai definitions of a system, since 
there are very many ofthem. Furthermore, the term varies a lot depending on subject or 
research area. Since "the definition of what a system is can be a touchy issue" (Hollnagel 
(2009 p. 20). 
13 
Before I present the different definitions of a system, here is an illustration: 
For example, is a mechanical wrist watch a system of integrated mechanical parts or not? If it 
is, where are the people? The illustration presented indicates that a system does not necessary 
have to include people. However, in many ofthe definitions that is presented below includes 
people and much more. 
However, first here is an introduction to system thinking that may help in explaining some of 
the interpretations. 
System thinking is an epistemology, when applied to human activity is based upon four basic 
ideas: emergence, hierarchy, communication, and con tro l as characteristics of systems. When 
applied to naturai or designed systems the crucial characteristic is the emergent properties of 
the who le. Emergence or emergent properties; is the principle that the whole entities exhibit 
properties which are meaningful only when attributed to the whole, not to its parts - e.g. the 
smell of ammonia. Every model of a human activity system exhibits properties as a whole 
entity which derive from its component activities and their structure, but cannot be reduced to 
them. Hierarchy; the principle that according to entities meaningfully treated as wholes are 
built up of small er entities which are themselves wholes ... and so on. In a hierarchy, 
emergent properties denote the level. Communication is the transfer of information. Control; 
is the process by means ofwhich a whole entity retains its identity and/or performance under 
changing circumstances. In the formal system model the decision-taking process ensures that 
the control action is taken in the light of the system's purpose or mission and the observed 
level of the measure ofperformance (Checkland, 2009 p. 312-318) 
The systems concept originated in the realm of the physical or natural sciences (e.g., physics 
and biology). Its migration to the social sciences entailed the acceptance of a rational and 
objective worldview that became the basis for social formalism and mechanical applications 
of systems theory to social research and practice. The concept was formalized by Bertalanfy 
(1956) in his discussion of General Systems Theory as "a set of elements standing in 
interaction" (Schwant and Szabla, 2007). 
According to Hollnagel, a system can broadly be defined as the intentional organisation or 
arrangement of parts (components, people, functions, subsystems) that makes it possible to 
achieve specified and required goals. Stolzer et al (20 l O, describe that auseful way to think 
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about the concept of systems, is that it is an amalgam of people, procedures and processes, 
and equipment that are integrated to perform a specific function or activity within a particular 
environment. Or as de fine by Stephans (2004), a system is a composite ofpeople, procedures, 
and plant and hardware working within a given environment to perform a given task. 
The first definition relates to a system as a means to achieve goals, the second definition sees 
a system as a method to function in a specific environment, while the third definition 
describes a system as a tool for a concrete task. 
Scwandt and Szabla (2007), emphasizes that in general, the core components of the definition 
of a system have not significantly varied of the 100 years they have examined in their study, 
based on studies from 1911 to 2007. According to them, each theorist seems to have accepted 
a general and simplistic definition of a system that included some set of defined elements and 
a number of relationships between and among the elements. However, what have varied are 
the nature of the elements and the complexity of their relationships. The above cited 
definitions support this observation. 
System can be open or closed or isolated. An apen system exchanges matler and energy with 
its surroundings. Most systems are open systems; like a car, coffeemaker, or computer. 
A closed system exchanges energy, but not matler, with its environment; like Earth or the 
project Biosphere2 or 3. An isolated system exchanges neither matler nor energy with its 
environment. A theoretical example of such system is the Universe (Wikipedia, 2012) 
2.5 Safety Management Systems (in aviation) 
I have gone through the definitions of the three main words in the dissertation; safety 
management systems. What is SMS then and how can it best be described and understood? 
According to Flouris, and Yilmaz (2011: 157), the safety management systems (SMS); is 
deeply rooted in organizational behavior theory. ICAO states that SMS is based on the 
principles of quality management systems (QMS). Stolzer et a 1(2010) define SMS as: a 
dynamic risk management system based on quality management (QMS) principles in a 
structure scaled appropriately to the operational risk, applied in a safety culture environment 
(Stolzer et al, 2010). It is however important to known the distinctions between quality and 
safety. Quality according to International Standards Organization (ISO) 9000:2005, defined as 
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"the degree to which a set of inherent characteristics fulfils requirements" (Mari o Periobon in 
Aerosafetyworld june 2012 p. 46). The definition of safety has always been presented earlier. 
According to Mario Periobon, the two principles are nevertheless related but not the same. 
While quality refers to meeting requirements, safety refers to keeping people and property 
from harm (Mario Periobon in Aerosafetyworldjune 2012 p. 46-47). The relationship 
between Safety Management System and Quality Management can better be understood when 
presented as in the figure 2.2 below . 
..... S.MS ... ·~-+ ('.IS: Comparison 
'ty System 
.. fnct corrective action monitoring 
eone.usions; 
.. good basis provided: by a-System 
.. kl< be rurttJer de\l!iltloped 
+ new Elements to be implemen~ed 
.. strive fot' integwated SOMS 
1 
Figure 2.3 Relation between Quality System and Safety Management System. Source: Swiss 
CAA 
Both systems strive to achieve a high level of safety. However, the approaches are partially 
different. Quality system (QS) is to ensure safe operations, and the approach is Safety 
Assurance /Compliance Monitoring. Safety management System is to reduce or maintain risk 
of harm to persons or property damage at or below an acceptable level, and the approach is 
risk-management & Safety Assurance / Compliance Monitoring (ICAO, 2009). Reason 
(2009), explains that a safety management system provides the administrative structures 
necessary to drive good safety practices. It focuses upon the technical and managerial factors 
associated with hazards. It is top-down and management-led. It is prescriptive - this is, it 
states how things ought to be. It is comprehensive, embracing all hazards and their 
requirement. 
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Chapter 3 Literature review 
This chapter is on the literature review. The literature review serves many different purposes 
and entails a wide variety of activities. Hence, literature review has been defined in a number 
of ways. But one of its main functions is to identify theories and the previous research which 
have influence the research topic, methodology being applied and the identifications of the 
problem to research. 
3.1 Current issues 
The number of airline departures has risen dramatically in the past few years; therefore, there is a 
ne ed to employ new methods and programs that can drive down accident rates (Stolzer et al 
2010). It is also vital to develop methods that not only maintain the current safety records but 
also cost-effective. Furthermore, there are airline operations and still many countries that are 
struggling with bad safety records that now have the option of adopting a more integrated 
system. The increase of airline departures naturally means an increased in volume and 
capacity for the other sectors of the airline industry. It is also important service providers are 
involved, and they meet the business demands and safety standards that the airliners are 
operating. 
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Figure 3.1 Air travel remains a growth market. Source: ICAO & Airbus 
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There is much that speaks for a further increase in capacity in many parts of the world and to 
be able to meet this demand. It is important the industry is best suited for the future 
development. For the regulators, it is an important step and opportunity to develop modem 
oversight methods and the development of performance based safety oversight, also known as 
risk-based oversight. 
3. 2 Cm"rent context 
The ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) is the foundation for my Master of Business 
Administration (MBA) dissertation. It is also the essential document for the regulatory 
framework for the implementation of safety management systems (SMS). The first edition 
was already published 2006 with the time frame that the 190 members countries should have 
implemented by 2009. Today, only a few countries have implemented SMS according to 
ICAO. Some countries have implemented with certain modifications, and other countries are 
waiting for how their states will adopt it. There are also cases were the service providers have 
implemented it without the involvement oftheir Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). In Europe, 
it has recently been mandated by the European A viation Safety Agency (EASA) through the 
implementing rules. 
3. 3 Evolution of system safety approach in aviation 
In aviation three main research areas have influence the development in system safety. It can 
be divided as studies in technical, human and organizational factors. The development in 
research areas can be divided into three time periods: 
1940s -1970s the focus was on technical factors. 
1970s- 1990s, the focus was on Human Factors. 
From the early 1990s the focus was on Organizational factors. Today, it is a combination of 
the three factors. 
3.3.1 Technical fadors 
The early days of aviation, those before and immediately following the Second World War 
until the 1970s, can be characterized as the "technical era" where safety concems were mostly 
related to technical factors. A viation was emerging as a mass transportation industry, yet the 
technology supporting its operations was not fuHy developed, and technological failures were 
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the recurring factor in safety breakdowns. The focus of safety endeavours was rightly placed 
on the investigation and improvement oftechnical factors (ICAO 2009). 
3. 3.2 Human fadors 
The early 1970s saw major technological advances in may areas such as, radar (both airbome 
and ground-based), autopilots, flight directors, improved navigation and communications 
capabilities and similar performance-enhancing technologies, both in the air and on the 
ground. This heralded the beginning of the "human era", and the focus of safety endeavours 
shifted to human performance and Human Factors, with the emergence of crew resource 
management (CRM), line-oriented flight training (LOFT), human-centred automation and 
other human performance interventions. The mid-1970s to the mid-1990s has been dubbed 
the "golden era" of aviation Human Factors, in reference to the huge investment by aviation 
to bring under control the elusive and ubiquitous human error. Nevertheless, in spite of the 
massive investment of resources in error mitigation, by the mid-1990s human performance 
continued to be singled out as a recurring factor in safety breakdowns. The downside of 
Human Factors endeavors during a significant portion of the "golden era" was that they 
tended to focus on the individual, with scant attention to the operational context in which 
individuals accomplished their missions (ICAO 2009). 
It was not until the early 1990s that it was first acknowledged that individuals do not operate 
in a vacuum, but within defined operational contexts. Although scientific literature was 
available regarding how features of an operational context can influence human performance 
and shape events and outcomes, it was not until the 1990s that the people in aviation industry 
acknowledged that fact. This signaled the beginning of the "organizational era" when safety 
began to be viewed from a systemic perspective, to encompass organizational, human and 
technical factors. It was also at that time that the notion of the organizational accident was 
embraced by aviation (ibid) 
Criticism on the single dimensional focus in human error principles and what human factors 
could not explain led to the concerns to understand the organizational factors 
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3. 3.3 Organizational factors 
Industry-wide acceptance of the concept of the organizational accident was made possible by 
a simple, yet graphically powerful, model developed by Professor James Reason, which 
provided a means for understanding how aviation (or any other production system) operates 
successfully or drifts into failure. According to this model, accidents require the coming 
together of a number of enabling factors - each one necessary, but in itself not sufficient to 
breach system defences. Because complex systems such as aviation are extremely well-
defended by layers of defences in depth, single-point failures are rare ly consequential in the 
aviation system. Equipment failures or operational errors are never the cause of breaches in 
safety defences, but rather the triggers. Breaches in safety defences are a delayed consequence 
of decisions made at the highest levels of the system, which remain dormant until their effects 
or damaging potential are activated by specific sets of operational circumstances. Under such 
specific circumstances, human failures or active failures at the operationallevel act as triggers 
oflatent conditions conducive to facilitating a breach of the system's inherent safety defences. 
In the concept advanced by the Reason model, an accidents include a combination of both 
active and latent conditions (ICAO 2009). Se section the latent condition model for their 
definition. 
The Reason model has influence much of the studies in system safety and is presented below 
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Figure 3.2.The perspective ofthe organizational accident (Source: ICAO, 2009) 
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3. 3.4 Operational context 
A simple, yet visually powerful, conceptual tool for the analysis of the components and 
features of operational contexts and their possible interactions with people is the SHEL 
model. The SHEL model (sometimes referred to as the SHEL(L) model) can be us ed to help 
visualize the interrelationships among the various components and features of the aviation 
system. This model places emphasis on the individual and the human's interfaces with the 
other components and features of the aviation system. The SHEL model' s name is derived 
from the initialletters of its four components: a) Software (S) (procedures, training, support, 
etc.); b) Hardware (H) (machines and equipment); c) Environment (E) (the operating 
circumstances in which the rest of the L-H-S system must function); and d) Liveware (L) 
(humans in the workplace) (ICAO 2009). 
Figure 3.3. The interface between various components in the operational context. Adapted 
from the SHELL model. 
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Figure 2 depicts a modified version of the SHEL model. The figure is intended to provide a 
better understanding of the relationship of individuals to components and features in the 
workplace. 
Liveware. In the centre of the model are the humans at the front line of operations. Although 
humans are remarkably adaptable, they are subject to considerable variations in performance. 
Humans are not standardized to the same degree as hardware, so the edges of this block are 
not simple and straight. Humans do not interface perfectly with the various components of the 
world in which they work. To avoid tensions that may compromise human performance, the 
effects of irregularities at the interfaces between the various SHEL blocks and the central 
Liveware block must be understood. The other components of the system must be carefully 
matched to humans if stresses in the system are to be avoided. Some of the more important 
factors affecting individual performance are: Physicaljactors: These include the human's 
physical capabilities to perf orm the required tasks, e.g. strength, height, reach, vision and 
hearing. Physiological jactors: These include those factors which affect the human's internal 
physical processes, which can compromise physical and cognitive performance, e.g. oxygen 
availability, general health and fitness, disease or illness, tobacco, drug or alcohol use, 
personal stress, fatigue and pregnancy. Psychological jactors: These include those factors 
affecting the psychological preparedness of the human to meet all the circumstances that 
might occur, e.g. adequacy of training, knowledge and experience, and workload. Psycho-
sodal jactors: These include all those external factors in the sodal system of humans that 
bring pressure to bear on them in their work and non-work environments, e.g. an argument 
with a supervisor, labour-management disputes, a death in the family, personal financial 
problems or other domestic tension (ibid). 
The interface between the human and technology or Liveware-Hardware (L-H) is the one 
most commonly considered when speaking of human performance. It determines how the 
human interfaces with the physical work environment, e.g. the design of seats to fit the sitting 
characteristics ofthe human body, displays to match the sensory and information processing 
characteristics of the user, and proper movement, coding and location of controls for the user. 
However, there is a naturai human tendency to adapt to L-H mismatches. This tendency may 
mask serious deficiencies, which may only become evident after an occurrence. 
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The L-S interface Liveware-Sojtware (L-S; is the relationship between the human and the 
supporting systems found in the workplace, e.g. regulations, manuals, checklists, publications, 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) and computer software. It includes such "user-
friendliness" issues as currency, accuracy, format and presentation, vocabulary, clarity and 
symbology. 
c) Liveware-Liveware (L-L). The L-L interface is the relationship between the human and 
other persons in the workplace. Flight crews, air traffic controllers, aircraft maintenance 
engineers and other operational personnei function as groups, and gro up influences play a role 
in determining human performance. The advent of crew resource management (CRM) has 
resulted in considerable focus on this interface. CRM training and its extension to air traffic 
services (ATS) (team resource management (TRM)) and maintenance (maintenance resource 
management (MRM)) focus on the management of operational errors. Staff/management 
relationships are also within the scope of this interface, as are corporate culture, corporate 
climate and company operating pressures, which can all significantly affect human 
performance. 
The interface between the human and both the internal and external environments (Liveware-
Environment (L-E). The internal workplace environment includes such physical 
considerations as temperature, ambient light, noise, vibration and air quality. The external 
environment includes such things as visibility, turbulence and terrain. The twenty-four hour a 
day, seven days a week, aviation work environment includes disturbances to normal 
biological rhythms, e.g. sleep patterns. In addition, the aviation system operates within a 
context of broad political and economic constraints, which in turn affect the overall corporate 
environment. Included here are such factors as the adequacy of physical facilities and 
supporting infrastructure, the local financial situation, and regulatory effectiveness. Just as the 
immediate work environment may create pressures to take short cuts, inadequate 
infrastructure support may also compromise the quality of decision-making. Care needs to be 
taken in order that operational errors do not "filter through the cracks" at the interfaces. 
For the most part, the rough edges ofthese interfaces can be managed, for example: a) The 
designer can ensure the performance reliability of the equipment under specified operating 
conditions. b) During the certification process, the regulatory authority can de fine realistic 
conditions under which the equipment may be used. c) The organization's management can 
develop standard operations procedures (SOPs) and provide initial and recurrent training for 
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the safe use of the equipment. d) Individual equipment operators can ensure their familiarity 
and confidence in us ing the equipment safely under all required operating conditions. 
3. 5 Approaches to Safety Management 
Safety management can be categorized into three main approaches. They are the person, 
engineering, and organizational model. 
The person model is exemplified by the traditional occupational safety approach. The 
emphases are upon individual unsafe acts and personal injury accidents. It views people as 
free agents capable of choosing between safe and unsafe behavior. This means that errors are 
perceived as being shaped predominantly by psychological factors such as inattention, 
forgetfulness, poor motivation, carelessness, lack of knowledge skills and experience, 
negligence and -on occasions- culpable recklessness. Its principal applications are those 
domains involving dose encounters with hazards (Reason, 1997). 
The most widely us ed countermeasures are 'fear appeal' poster campaigns, rewards and 
punishments, unsafe act auditing, writing another procedure, training and selection. Progress 
is measured by personal injury statistics, such as fatalities, lost-time injuries, medical 
treatment cases, first aid cases and the like. It is frequently underspinned by the 'iceberg' and 
'pyramid' views of accident (Reason, 1997). 
The engineering model has its origins in reliability engineering, traditional ergonomics (and 
its modem variant - cognitive engineering) risk management and human reliability 
assessment. Typically the model focuses on how the performance ofthe front-line operators 
(for example, control room operators and pilots) is influenced by the characteristics of the 
workplace or specifically, by the informational properties of the human-machine interface. 
Research in this area was originally supported by the nudear power industry, the military, the 
space agencies, the chemical process industries, oil and gas industries and aviation - domains 
in which the safety of a system hinges critically on the reliability of a small number of human 
controllers. The practical applications of this approach include: hazard operability studies 
(HAZOPS), hazard analysis studies (HAZANS), probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), 
technical safety audits, reliability and maintainability studies (RAMS), human reliability 
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assessment (HRA), cognitive task analyses, ergonomi c guidelines, databases, and the 
application of decision support systems (Reason, 1997). 
The organizational model disciplinary link is with crisis management. According to Reason, 
this is not always apparent to its practitioners. The intellectual origins are based on two main 
works. The first was 'Man-Made Disaster (1978)' by Barry Turner and the second major 
influence was Normal Accidents (1984) by Charles Perrow. The model emphasises the 
necessity for proactive measures of 'safety health' and the needs for continual reforms ofthe 
system's basic processes. As such, it has much in common with Total Quality Management. 
Indeed, the organizational model deliberately blurs the distinction between safety-related and 
quality-determining factors. Both are viewed as important for increasing the system's intrinsic 
resistance to its operational hazards. Both are seen as being implicated in organizational 
accidents (Reason, 1997). 
3. 5.1 Main differences in the three approaches to Safety Management 
According to Reason, the Person model is the most adopted of the three approaches and has 
the longe st history, stretching back to the beginnings ofindustrialization. It is usually policed 
by safety departments and safety professionals, though - more recently - the accent has been 
upon personal responsibility. The engineering model in contrast to the person model, human 
errors are not regarded simply as the product of what goes on between an individual' s ears. 
Rather, they emerge from human-machine mismatches, or poor human engineering - that is, 
the failure on the part of the system designers to tailor the system appropriately to the 
cognitive strengths and weaknesses of its human controllers. The organizational model views 
human error more as a consequence than as a cause. Errors are the symptoms that reveal the 
presence of latent conditions in the system at large. They are important only in so far as they 
adversely affect the integrity of the defences. In many respects, the organizational model is 
simply an extension of the engineering model and is in no way incompatible with it. Human-
machine mismatches are seen as being the result of prior decisions in the upper echelons of 
the system. And these, in turns, are shaped by wider regulatory and societal factors. 
The engineering and organizational models are both necessary for understanding the aetiology 
of organizational accidents and for limiting their occurrence. Where there is a conflict is 
between both of these models and large ly person-directed approach of the traditional 
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occupation safety professionals. However, these differences are often more a matter of 
circumstance than of substance (Reason, 1997). 
3. 6 Safety science - explaining accidents and creating safety 
The literature review shows that there are severai models that have been adopted to explain 
how we can understand safety. Important to bear in mind is that, while on the one hand there 
are models/theories that try to treat accident as 'the outcome of a series of events along a 
linear pathway and see risk as the uncontrolled release of energy' on the other hand mo dels 
and theory that treat 'how accidents emerge from the interaction of multitude of events, 
processes and relationship in a complex system, and that take a more interactive, sociological 
perspective on risk' (Woods et al 2010. p. 36). 
3. 6.1 Linear and latent conditions models 
The three main models that fall under the linear and latent failure models are: 
• The sequence-of events model. 
• Man-made disaster theory. 
• The latent conditions model. 
3. 6.2 The sequence-of events model or the domino model. 
The linear way of conceptualizing how events interact to produce a mishap was first 
articulated by Heimich in 1931 and is still a common place today. According to this model, 
events preceding the accident happen linearly, in a fixed order, and the accident itselfis the 
last event in the sequence (Woods et al, 2010). It has been known too, as the domino model, 
for its depiction of an accident as the endpoint in a string of falling dominoes. Consistent with 
the idea of a linear chain of events is the notion of a root cause - a trigger at the beginning of 
the chain that sets everything in motion ( the first domino that falls and then, one by one, the 
rest. The sequence-of-events idea is pervasive, even if multiple parallei or converging 
sequences are sometimes depicted to try to capture some of the greater complexity of the 
precursors to an accident. The idea forms the basic prernise of many risk analysis methods 
and tools such as fault-tree analysis, probabilistic risk assessment, critical path models and 
more. 
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Also consistent with the chain of events is the notion of barriers - aseparation between the 
source ofhazard and the object or activity that needs protection. Barriers can be seen as 
blockages between dominoes that prevent the fall of one affecting the next, thereby stopping 
the chain of reaction. From the 1960s to the early 1980s, the barrier perspective gained new 
ground as a basis for accident prevention. Accidents were typically seen as a problem of 
uncontrolled transfer ofharmful energy, and safety interventions were based on putting 
barriers between the energy source and the object to be protected. 
W ood et al (20 l O) indicates that complications in the sequence-of events is that people can 
assume a cause-consequence equivalence, where each effect is a cause, and each cause is an 
effect, but also a symmetry between cause and effect. Thus, they argue that, this has be come 
an assumption that we often take for granted in our considerations of accidents. In the sense 
that, people may take for granted a symmetry between cause and effects, for example, that a 
very big effect (e.g., in the numbers offatalities) must have been due to a very big cause (e.g., 
egregious errors). 
Wood et al (20 l O) emphasis that the sequence-of-events is blind to patterns about cognitive 
systems and organizational dynamics. In their view, people only appear as another step that 
determined a branch or continuation of the sequence underway. Such that human performance 
becomes a discrete, binary event - the human did or did not do something - which failed to 
block the sequence or continued the sequence. Thus, these errors constitute a cause in the 
chain of cause/effects that led to the eventual outcome. Furthermore, outsiders can easily 
construct alternative sequence, "the accident would only have been avoided if only those 
people had seen or done this or that". Versions of such thinking show up in accident reports 
and remarks by stakeholders after accidents. 
3. 6.3 Man-made disaster theOl"Y 
In 1978, Barry turner offered one of the first accounts of accidents as a result of normal 
everyday organizational decision making. Accidents, Turner concluded, are neither chance 
events, nor acts of God, nor triggered by a few events and unsafe human acts. Nor is it useful 
to describe accidents in terms of the technology itself (Pigeon and O' Leary, 2000 cited in 
Woods et al 2010). According to Wood et al (2010), Turner's ide a was that "man-made 
disasters" often start small, with seemingly insignificant operational and managerial 
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decisions. From then, there is an incubation period. Over a long period of time, problems 
accumulate and the organization' s view of itself and how it manages its risks grows 
increasingly at odds with the actual state of affairs (miscalibration), until this mismatch 
actually explodes into the open in the form of an accident (Turner, 1978 cited in Woods et al 
2010). 
Man-made disaster theory preserved important notions of the sequence-of events model (e.g, 
problems at the root that served to trigger others over time) even if the sequence spre ad 
further into the organization and deeper into history than in any previous mo dels of accidents. 
Yet the Turner' s insight added new focus and language to the arsenal of safety thinking 
(Woods et al, 2010). 
An important post-accident discovery highlighted by man-made disaster theory is that 
seemingly innocuous organizational decisions turned out to interact, over time, with other 
preconditions in complex and unintended ways. None ofthose contributors alone is likely to 
trigger the revelatory accident, but the way they interact and add up falls outside the 
predictive scope ofpeople's model oftheir organization and its hazard control up to that 
moment. 
Wood et al (2010) point out that Tumer's account was innovative because he did not define 
accidents in terms oftheir physical impact (e.g, uncontrolled energy release) or as a linear 
sequence of events. Rather, he saw accidents as organizational and sociological phenomena. 
Thus, accidents represent a disruption in how people believe their system operates; a collapse 
of their own norms about hazard and how to manage them. An accident, in other words, 
comes as a shock to the image that the organization has of itself, of its risks and how to 
contain them. The developing vulnerability is hidden by the organization's beliefthat it has 
risk under control. 
Lanir (1986) used the term "fundamental surprise," to capture this sudden revelation that 
one's perception of the world is entirely incompatible with reality (cited in Woods et al, 
2010). Woods et al (2010) point out that, interestingly, the surprise in man-made disaster 
theory is not that a system that is normally successful suddenly suffers a catastrophic 
breakdown. Rather, the surprise is that a successful system produces failure as a systematic 
by-product ofhow it normally works. 
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3.6.4 The latent conditions model (aka "swiss cheese") 
The latent failure model is an evolution and combination of the ideas from preceding theories 
and models on accident causation, particularly the sequence-of-events model and Man-made 
disaster theory (Wood et al (2010). The model was introduced by James Reason in 1990. 
However, during the years it has there have been severai modifications to the name of the 
model. When the term first appeared it was as "latent errors", then it changed to "latent 
failures". Now the term "latent conditions" is preferred, since it does not necessarily involve 
either error or failure (Reason, 1997 p. 20). Despite this, many researchers still today use the 
term "latent failure" when referring to this model. 
According to the "latent conditions" model, disasters are characterized by a concatenation of 
severai small failures and contributing factors - each one necessary, but in itselfnot 
sufficient to breach system def enses (Reason, 1997; woods et al, 2010, ICAO, 2009). An 
example, because complex systems such as aviation are extremely well-defended by layers of 
defences in depth, single-point failures are rarely consequential in the aviation system. 
Equipment failures or operational errors are never the cause of breaches in safety defences, 
but rather the triggers. Breaches in safety defenses are a delayed consequence of decisions 
made at the highest levels of the system, which remain dormant until their effects or 
damaging potential are activated by specific sets of operational circumstances. Under such 
specific circumstances, human failures or active failures at the operationallevel act as triggers 
of latent conditions conducive to facilitating a breach of the system' s inherent safety defences. 
In the concept advanced by the Reason model, all accidents include a combination of both 
active and latent conditions (ICAO 2009) 
The latent condition thus distinguishes between active failures and latent conditions: 
Active failures are actions or inactions, including errors and violations, which have an 
immediate adverse effect. They are generally viewed, with the benefit of hindsight, as unsafe 
acts. Active failures are generally associated with front-line personnel (pilots, air traffic 
controllers, aircraft mechanical engineers, etc.) and may result in adamaging outcome. They 
hold the potential to penetrate the defences put in place by the organization, regulatory 
authorities, etc. to protect the aviation system. Active failures may be the result of normal 
errors, or they may result from deviations from prescribed procedures and practices. 
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Latent conditions are conditions present in the system weU before adamaging outcome is 
experieneed, and made evident by Ioeal triggering faetors. The eonsequenees of latent 
conditions may remain dormant for a long time. Individually, these latent conditions are 
usually not perceived as harmful, since they are not perceived as being failures in the first 
place. Latent conditions become evident once the system's defences have been breached. 
These conditions are associated with mangers, designers, maintainers, or regulators - people 
who are generally far removed in time and spaee from the event (Reason 1997, Wood et al, 
2010, ICAO, 2009). 
Active failure and latent conditions model be deseribed as sueh: 
ACCIDENT 
Figure 3.4 Active failure and latent eonditions. Source: Woods et al, 2010. 
Complex system failure according to the latent conditions model. Failures in these systems 
require a combination of multiple faetors. The system is defended against failure but these 
defences have defects or "hoIes" that allow aceidents to oceur. 
Woods et al (2010) states that a very important contribution of the latent conditions model is 
that it brought about making many more stakeholders think more critieally about the rieh 
context that surrounds and helps produee aecidents. 
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Critic or limitation of the latent conditions model: 
- The depiction of complex system as a static set of layers present problems. This is because, 
it does not explain how such latent conditions come into being, nor how they actually 
combine with active failures. 
- AIso, the model does not tell how layers of defence are gradually eroded, for example under 
the pressures of production and resource limitations and over-confidence based on successful 
past outcomes (W ood et al, 20 l O). 
3.7. Complexity, control and sodological models 
The main theories that examine how accidents emerge from the interaction of a multitude of 
events, processes and relationships in a complex system and that take a more interactive, 
sociological perspective on risk are: 
• Normal-accident theory 
• Control theory 
• High-reliability theory 
3.7.1 Normal-acddent theory 
Perrow (1984) promoted the idea of system accidents. Rather being the result of a few or a 
number of component failures, accidents involve the unanticipated interaction of a multitude 
of events in a complex system - events and interactions whose combinatorial explosion can 
quickly outwit people's best efforts at predicting and mitigating disaster. The scale and 
coupling of these systems creates a different pattem for disaster where incidents develop or 
evolve through a conjunction of severai small failures. Yet to Normal Accident Theory, 
analytically speaking, such accidents need not be surprising at all (not even in a fundamental 
sense). The central thesis ofwhat has become known as normal accident theory (Perrow, 
1984) is that accidents are the structural and virtually inevitable product of systems that are 
both interactively complex and tightly coupled (Wood et al, 2010) 
According to Wood et al (2010), interactive complexity and coupling are two presurnably 
different dimensions along which Perrow plotted a number of systems (from manufacturing to 
military operations to nuclear power plants). The separation into two dimensions has spawned 
a lot ofthinking and discussion (including whether they are separable at all). And has offered 
new ways of looking at how to manage and control complex dynamic techno lo gies, as weU as 
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suggesting what may lie behind the label "human error" if things go wrong in a tightly 
coupled interactively complex system. Normal accident theory predicts that the more tightly 
coupled and complex a system is, the more prone it is suffering a "normal" accident. 
Interactive complexity refers to component interactions that are non-linear, unfamiliar, 
unexpected or unplanned, and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible for people 
running the system. Linear interactions are those in expected and familiar production or 
maintenance sequences, and those that are quite visible and understandable, even if 
unplanned. Complex interactions are those of unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned and 
unexpected sequences and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible (Perrow, 
1984) 
Wood et al (2010), argue that humans can hardly be recipient victims of complexity and 
coupling alone. According to them, the very definition of Perrowian complexity actually 
involves both human and system, to the point where it becomes hard to see where one ends 
and the other begins. Furthermore, they argue that the categories of complexity and coupling 
are not as independent as normal accident theory suggests. The also indicate that another 
problem arise when complexity and coupling are treated as stable properties of a system, 
because it misses the dynamic nature of much safety-crictical work and the ebb and flow of 
cognitive and coordinative activity to manage it. 
3.7.2 Control theory 
Accident models based on control theory explicitly look at accidents as emerging from 
interactions among system components. They usually do not identify single causal factors, but 
rather look at what may have gone wrong with the system's operation or organization of the 
hazardous technology that allowed an accident to take place (Wood et al, 2010). According 
Rasmussen, 1997) safety or risk management is therefore view as a control problem (cited in 
Wood et al, 20 l O), and accidents happen when components are not adequately handled; when 
safety constraints that should have applied to the design and operation of the technology have 
loosened, or be come badly monitored, managed, controlled (Wood et al, 20 l O). 
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Other main distinctive characteristic of control theory are: 
• Control theory tries to capture imperfect proeesses, which involve people, societal and 
organizational structures, engineering activities, and physical parts. 
• Control theory sees the operation of hazardous technology as a matter of keeping many 
interrelated components in a state of dynamic equilibrium (which means that control inputs, 
even if small, are continually necessary for the system to stay safe: it cannot be left on its own 
as could a statically stable system). Keeping a dynamically stable system in equilibrium 
happens through the use of feedback loops of information and control. Thus, accidents are not 
the result of initiating (root cause) event that triggers a series of events, which eventually 
leads to a loss. Instead, accidents result from interactions among components that violate the 
safety constraints on system design and operation, by which feedback and control inputs can 
grow increasingly at odds with the real problem or processes to be controlled. 
• Control theory embraces a much more complex idea of causation, taken from complexity 
theory. Small changes somewhere in the system, or small variations in the initial state of a 
process, can lead to huge consequences elsewhere. The Newtonian symmetry between cause 
and effects no longer applies. 
• Control theory sees accidents as the result of normal system behavior, as organizations try to 
adapt to multiple, normal pressures that operate on it every day (Woods et al, 2010). 
3.7.3 High-reliabHity theory 
High reliability theory describes the extent and nature of the effort that people, at allievels in 
an organization, have to engage in to ensure consistently safe operations despite its inherent 
complexity and risk (Woods et al, 20 l O). 
Critique of the model is that: 
• Wrong assumptions, since the operational people, those who work at the sharp end of an 
organization hardly defined safety in terms of risk management or error avoidance. 
• The model also sustains decomposition assumptions that are not really applicable to 
complex systems (Leveson, 2002 cited in Woods et al, 2010). For example, it suggests that 
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each component or sub-system (layer of defence) operates reasonably independently, so that 
the results of a safety analysis (e.g., inspection or certification of people or components or 
sub-systems) are not distorted when we start putting the pieces back together again. It also 
assurnes that the principles that gov em the assembly of the entire system from its constituent 
sub-systems or components are straightforward. And that the interactions, if any, between the 
sub-systems will be linear: not subject to anticipated feedback loops or non-linear 
interactions. 
What is interesting and also important here are that not all the models/theories can be without 
care, adapted to creating and understanding safety in complex systems.This is because, 
understanding and knowing their limitations and areas of adaption is important in creating 
safety and working in a demanding environment such as complex systems. Furthermore, there 
are important in understanding the concept of system. 
3.8 Summary 
In this chapter, I have through the literature review tried to relate earlier studies on system 
safety or safety system to the theoretical approach. These include historical background on 
where the research in civil aviation focused on through different time periods. In the process I 
have presented different safety and accidents models. I have also shown how the trend will be 
in the future on the number of airline departures. In this context, it is important to have 
systems that can tackle this development. In the process, I have argued for why there is a need 
for to have better systems for those who have not implemented such systems today. 
Furthermore, the opportunity such system can help the civil aviation authorities in 
performance-based safety oversight. 
34 
Chapter 4 Promoting and inhibiting factors in system safety programs 
In this chapter I will present how I have come about to elaborate the factors that are important 
for implementing Safety Management System. To try to answer the question on factors that 
are important for promoting Safety Management System, I have adopted the McKiney 7-s 
modelon strategy implementation. The model is explained below. To try to answer the 
questions on what inhibits or restrains the implementation of Safety Management system, I 
have looked for the key problem areas in safety system or system Safety. 8-key problem areas 
were identified. 
4.1. What promotes implementation of Safety management system in aviation? 
In order to answer this question, I have looked for factors that are important for 
implementation. Through the literature review, I discovered that I could adopt the McKiney 
7-s model for the purpose in the study. Today it is better known or referred to as the 7-s 
model. According to Kaplan (2005), the model was introduced by McKinsey partners Tom 
Peters and Robert Waterman in the book "In Search of Excellence". In brief, the model, 
describes the seven factors critical for effective strategy execution. The McKiney 7-s 
comprise of: st yle, skills, staff, schemes, structure, shared values and systems. 
4.1.1 Definition ofvariables and categories as enablers 
References to this section are based on Kaplan (2005) and Osarenkhoe (2006). 
Factors that promotes the implementation 
Safety leadership or Leadership of safety (style): 
The leadership st yle of managers - how they spend their time, what they focus 
attention on, what questions they ask of employees, how they make decisions; also 
the organizational culture (the dominant values and beliefs, the norms, the 
conscious and unconscious symbolic acts taken by leaders (job titles, dress 
codes, executive dining rooms, corporate jets, informal meetings with 
employees ). 
Procedures and Policy (ski/Is): 
The distinctive competencies of the organization; what it does best along 
dimensions such as people, management practices, proeesses, systems, 
technology, and customer relationships. 
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Training and Recurrency training (Stajj): 
The people, their backgrounds and competencies; how the organization recruits, 
selects, trains, socializes, manages the careers, and promotes employees. 
Business Objectives (Strategy /Schemes): The positioning and actions taken by 
an enterprise, in response to or anticipation of changes in the external 
environment, intended to acmeve competitive advantage. 
Organizational Structure (Strueture): 
The way in which tasks and people are specialized and divided, and authority is 
distributed; how activities and reporting relationships are grouped; the 
mechanisms by which activities in the organization are coordinated. 
Safety Culture (Shared values): 
The core or fundamental set of values that are widely shared in the 
organization and serve as guiding principles of what is important; vision, 
mission, and values statements that provide a broad sense of purpose for all 
employees. 
Software Management (Systems): 
The formal and informal procedures used to manage the organization, including 
management control systems, performance measurement and reward 
systems, planning, budgeting and re source allocation systems, and 
management information systems. 
4.2 General problems in system safety 
Stephans (2004), mention eight general problem areas related to system safety that are vital 
for safety services. These problem are as are interrelated; however, they can be summarized as 
follows: 
• Standardization 
• Risk assessment codes 
• Data 
• Communications 
• Life Cyc1e 
• Education and training 
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• Human factors 
• Software 
For my questionnaire and research design, I have reduced the number to 7. The reason for this 
is that data and communications factors are very similar. Instead of treating them as two 
separate or different issues, they are reduced to one factor and renamed as "Quality Data and 
information" 
4.2.1 Definition of variables and categories as inhibitors 
Below are factors that inhibit implementation of Safety Management System in aviation. 
These are regarded as general problem areas in safety system. 
Standardization 
Standardization as an inhibiting factor implies lack of standard terms, basic tools and 
techniques 
Resources 
Resources can be divided into at least three categories; human, technical and financial. 
Example: Budgetary factors such as lack of resources to fund activities 
Authority Regulations 
How authority information is interpretated, different practices of the same regulation 
among different national authorities. Furthermore, communication and partnership 
with the market. 
Indicators (risk assessment) 
There is no standard risk assessment code (RAC). Thus, the process is too subjective 
and furthermore, creates difficulties in establishing and comparing indicators. 
Quality data and information 
The lack of systematie cataloging and uniform methods of data analysis; this includes 
reporting routines. 
Human factors 
There is considerably less reliable data available on human performance than on 
hardware. 
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Software knowledge 
Software is applied and functions independently of the total effort 
4.3 Model for analysis 
+ 
(enablers) (inhibitors) 
Safety Standardization 
Leadership 
Procedures Resources 
& 
Policy 
Authority 
Training & Regulations 
Recurrent Training 
Business Indicators 
Objectives (Risk Assessment) 
Organizational Quality Data & 
Structure Information 
Safety Human 
Culture Factors 
Software Software 
Management Knowlegde 
t t 
Figure 4.1 Model for analysis of promoting and inhibiting factors in Safety Management 
System implementation. 
The model for analysis is constructed based ofthe main question in the study, and from the 
different sources from the literature review. It is a holistic approach and in line with the 
theoretical approach I have chosen. On the right hand side are the enablers or prornoters and 
on the left side are the inhibitors. The enabling factors can also be seen as the factors for 
strategic implementation. The inhibiting factors are general problems areas in system safety. 
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The arrows indicate that the elements in the model are not constant. Both enablers and 
inhibitors influence each other. The dotted line illustrates that within each side the dimensjon 
or balance changes. For example, too much focus on the business objectives can reduce the 
attention on the other elements. 
4.4 Summary 
I have described in this chapter how I have through the literature review come to separate 
between the promoting (enablers/facilitators) factors and the inhibiting (barrierslinhibitorsl 
restraining) factors. Based on these factors, I have presented the model for analysis that I 
intend to apply in the research. The model for analysis is related to the question I have earlier 
posed. Further, it can be us ed a theoretical model in the analysis of Complex systems The 
model is holistic, and neither should it be conceptualized as static. In Chapter 9, this model 
will be presented in a wider context. 
Remarks 
It is always difficult to divide between what is a prornoter or an inhibitor, since there are 
always many other elements can be involved or included in the concept. This can be very 
challenging, especially when undertaking a survey. Thus, the answer may vary according to 
the followings: 
The knowledge of those who answer 
It depends very much on the situation or their experiences 
Cultural aspect 
The concept is interpreted as two sides of the same thing 
The last point is very interesting from a complexity system theOl)' point of view. It is 
interesting in the sense that it try's to study why the changes come about. Furthermore, it does 
not see structure as "static". It is therefore important to bear in mind that these factors are not 
constant (static). 
According to Anantamula and Kanungo; 'it may be not useful to normatively classify 
elements as facilitators or inhibitors'. However, from the standpoint of enablers and barriers, 
this approach allows us to understand how each of these elements can behave as an enabler as 
weU as an inhibitor (Anantatmula & Kanungo 2007, p. 7). 
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I also believe that the 7 -s model can be applied as a holistic approach to safety organizations, 
since it covers many factors that are often left out. 
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Chapter 5 Methodology 
This chapter is on methodological issues concerning research and research methods in 
management. It includes also the research and questionnaire design for the study. 
5.1. What is methodology? 
Methodology is a combination of techniques used to inquire into a specific situation 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). It raises all sorts ofphilosophical questions about what is 
possible for researchers to know and how valid their claims to knowledge might be. (Fischer 
2004). The philosophical questions can be summarized to four areas of assumptions, which 
are of ontological, epistemological, human nature and methodological nature. 
Ontology or assumptions of ontological nature according Burrell and Morgan (1979), 
concerns the very essence of the phenomena under investigation. The basic ontological 
question a social scientist faces is whether the 'reality' to be investigated is external to the 
individual - imposing itself on the individual consciousness from without - or the product of 
individual consciousness; whether 'reality' is of an 'objective' nature, or the product of 
individual cognition; whether 'reality' is a given 'out there in the world, or product of one's 
mind. 
There are four different types of ontological views; realism, internal realism, relativism and 
nominalism. 
Table 5.1 Four different types of ontologies 
Truth Single truth Truth exists, but is There are many There is no truth 
obscure 'truths' 
Facts Facts exist and can Facts are concrete, Facts depend on the Facts are all human 
be revealed but cannot be viewpoint of the creations 
accessed directly observer 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al. (2012 p. 19) 
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Epistemology or assumptions of epistemological nature are assumptions about the grounds of 
knowledge - about how one might be gin to understand the world and communicate this 
knowledge to fellow human beings. These assumptions entail ideas, for example about what 
forms ofknowledge can be obtained, and how one can sort out what is regarded as 'true' from 
what is to be regarded as 'false'. The epistemological assumptions in these instances 
determine extreme positions on the issue of whether knowledge is something which can be 
acquired on one hand, or is something that has to be personally experienced on the other 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The other views are presented below: 
Positivism; is that the social world exists extemally, and that its properties should be 
measured through objective methods, rather than being inferred subjectively through 
sensation, reflection and intuition. Social constructionism, focuses on the ways that people 
make sense of the world, especially through sharing their experiences with others via the 
medium of language. In other words, 'reality' is determined by people rather than by 
objective and extemal factors (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). 
The human nature assumptions entail a view of human beings responding in a mechanistic or 
deterministie fashion to the situations encountered in their extemal world. This view tends to 
be one in which human beings and their experiences are regarded as products of their 
environment; one in which humans are conditioned by their extemal circumstances. This 
perspective can be contrasted with one which attributes to human beings a much more 
creative role: with a perspective where 'free will' occupies the centre of the stage; where man 
is regarded as the creator of his environment, the controller as opposed to the controlled, the 
master rather than the marionette. In these two extreme views of the relationship between 
humans beings and their environment, one finds great philosophical debates between the 
advocates of determinism on the one hand and the voluntarism on the other (Burrell and 
Morgan 1979). 
Assumptions of methodological nature are influenced by the way one attempts to investigate 
and obtain 'knowledge' about the soeial world. Since different ontologies, epistemologies 
and models of human nature are likely to incline soeial scientists towards different 
methodologies. The methodological issues of importance that treat the soeial world as if it 
were a hard, extemal, objective reality are thus the concepts themselves, their measurement 
and identification ofunderlying thernes. However, the methodological issues ofimportance 
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that view sodal reality that stresses the importance ofthe subjective experience of individuals 
in the creation of the sodal world. The principal concern is with understanding the way in 
which individuals creates, modifies and interprets the world in which he or she finds herself. 
In extreme cases, the emphasis is placed upon the explanation and understanding of what is 
unique and particular to the individual rather than what is general or universal. In short, the 
approach questions whether there exists an extemal reality worthy of study (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). 
Thus, understanding the philosophical issues has bearing on interpreting research, performing 
research and the production of knowledge. 
The approach I have chosen is relativism. According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2012), the 
ontological view in relativism, is that phenomena depend on the perspective from which we 
observe them. The epistemological position is that observation will be more accurate or 
credible, if made from severai different perspectives. I am aware that how the questions have 
been constructed have some bearing on the results in my study. I also believe that if resources 
were available (more time), qualitative study would be needed to get more answers. 
5.2 Realist research 
It is common that most of the research in management take a realist approach (Fisher, 2004), 
many textbooks treat realism and positivism as the same. However, they "should be treated 
as separate approaches" according to (Johns on and Duberley, 2004 in Fisher 2004, p. 35). I 
believe that claiming that realism and positivism are the same, has methodological 
implications that might result in applying wrong methods. However, it is correct to say that 
both realism and positivism are associated to functionalist perspectives and objectivist views. 
However, it would be wrong to claim that realism and positivism are the same, when defining 
what 'knowledge' and reality they attempt to explain. 
Furthermore, this issue is very important when attempting methodological pluralism. Meaning 
when one try' s to adopt approaches from two different philosophical dimensions in a 
research. Fisher (2004), the big question is whether it is possible to combine realist research 
and an interpretative approach? Gill and Johnson (1997), "argue that ifyou take a realist 
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stance, then aspects of an interpretivist approach could be brought in auseful adjunct to the 
research. But they also claim that the reverse is not true" (in Fisher 2004: 49). 
There are at least two ways in which interpretivism may be called in to aid realist research: 
l. A research may start off with a piece of realist research that identifies an association 
between two variables, then use an interpretative approach to understand causal 
connection, mechanism, which shows in all complexity how different aspects 
interact. 
2. The other possibility uses the ease with which interpretivist research generates 
hypotheses about the associations between variables. In this case interpretivist research 
is ground-clearing operation that precedes a piece of realist research (Fisher 2004). 
5.3 Research design 
Based on the literature review, I have been able to identify and summarize what I mean are 
important factors that are vital in promoting or inhibiting Safety Management System 
implementation. These are factors that are highlighted and of concem in system safety 
studies. The terminology or wording in many of the literature is different, but in general, they 
describe and to relate to the same issues. 
5.3.1 Questionnaire design 
Since I wanted to study the attitude towards the promoting and inhibiting factors, the Likert 
scale was chosen for the purpose. I chose the original Likert scale Scale of 1-5; and the reason 
is that it is easily identifiable and commonly use. 
According to Riley et al., "the Likert scale assumes the groupness of attitudes so that 
dimensions are said to be related and therefore only total sample scores can be interpreted. To 
put it simple, the objective of an attitude survey is to find this positive-negative tendency 
towards the object. This is done by developing an equal number of positive and negative 
statements about the object then invite the subject to say to what extent they agree or disagree 
with the statement. If we are measuring a tendency then there must be some dividing line 
between positive and negative. The mid-point in the scale fulfills this function. The measuring 
principle is to find a total score and see ifthe subjects are above or below the mid-point score: 
above means positive, and below negative" (Riley et al. 2000, p. 121) 
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In the study, the scale Very Import =5, Important = 4, Uncertain =3, Little important = 2, and 
Not Important = l, was used for finding out the importance ofthe enablers and inhibitors for 
the respondents. The scale Strongly Agree =5, Agreet = 4, Uncertain =3, Disgaree = 2, and 
Strongly Disagree = 1, was used to find out the opinion on the relevance of SMS. 
Preparing or finding a question that cannot be easily misunderstood is not an easy task. 
Especially when defining a questionnaire. There is always the possibility of creating leading 
question but also confusing question. Leading question can be questions design to gi ve more 
the view of the researcher than the issue under study. Confusing questions can be how the 
question is posed but also the sentences or terms are contradicting. 
Two main questions were posed. In the first question, it was to rank: promoting factors 
according to the Likert scale. Theses factors are regarded as important strategi c elements. As 
earlier mentioned, I see my contribution to system safety studies is a holistic approach to the 
organizational factors. Important here is that the focus in most studies have been mainly on 
management. The other factors existing in an organization is not c1early stated. Furthermore, 
the debates end in most cases by packaging the organizational issues as production demands. I 
have chosen to adapt the 7-s strategic items, since these are not only important for any 
business success but indeed essential a successful strategic implementation. 
In the second question, it was to rank: inhibiting factors that restrain SMS implementation. 
These factors are also identified through the literature review as problem areas in system 
safety. 
The questions were kept simple because SMS applies to different sectors in the aviation 
industry. In other word, the question was not only intended or directed to a specific sector or 
area. The questionnaire consisted of two parts. In the first part, respondents were asked to 
rank: the importance of 7 enablers and 7 inhibitors of SMS implementation. The second part 
was to get background information of the respondents. This part was intended to be used as 
control questions. It inc1uded work titles, main country of operation, and knowledge of SMS. 
The research was first intended to be operators in Norway. Two companies were contacted to 
conduct/distribute the questionnaire intemally. When I saw that I was not getting response. I 
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decided to publish the questionnaire on LinkedIn. The questionnaire survey was conducted 
from16 April 2012 to 14 May 2012 on an internet website targeting aviation professionals 
with interest in Safety Management, and only a total of 31 effective samples were obtained. 
Unfortunately, the response was not overwhelming. But the answers were no doubt interesting 
despite the low response rate. 
However, I have decided to present the results here and for that matter the dissertation takes a 
more theoretical approach. The lessons from the response despite the low response rate should 
not be underrated. Since it gives knowledge of the follow: 
how questionnaire on Safety Management System should be conducted and 
developed 
issues that need to be followed up, say through qualitative studies. 
When publishing a questionnaire on the internet, one cannot say much about the population. 
5 A.l Reliability and validity 
Reliability is about replication (being) able to repeat or reproduce results. Example in an 
attitude research; a scale is reliable to the extent to which repeated applications of the scale 
produce the same results given that the attitudes under investigation remains the same. 
Validity, on the other hand, is about whether your measuring instrument actually measures the 
specific attitudes you set out to find not some alternative attitudes however closely they may 
be related (Riley et al., 2000) 
The reliability in my study would therefore, if I performed the same investigation and got the 
same answer. The reliability would even be better if another researcher had come up with the 
same results. 
The validity of the study can be discussed, since the study was intended for different are as in 
aviation. The meaning and definitions of some of the 'factors' will therefore have different 
interpretations, depending on how it is used in that sector. Another issue is the cultural aspect. 
Although the definitions may be the same, the meanings would be different depending on the 
cultural setting and how things are done. The responses in this study came from 16 different 
countries. 
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Chapter 6 Data analysis 
In this chapter I will present the results from the survey. 
6.1. Safety leadership as a fador in promoting Safety Management System 
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Figure 6.1 Safety Leadership as a promoting factor in SMS. (Percent) N=31 
Figure 6.1 indicates that Safety leadership is clearly recognized as an important enabler for 
SMS. The figure shows that 97 percent of the respondents regard safety leadership as an 
important or very important factor for implementing SMS. The average score for all the 
answers is 4,8 on a scale from 1-5. It is also the highest score for factors regarded as 
important for promoting SMS implementation. The indication is that safety leadership is a 
very important enabler and the result is not surprising. 
Safety leadership is the key word in the management of safety. The purpose of a SMS, is a 
management system for ensuring safe and efficient operations. In the ICAO context, this falls 
under what is defined as safety accountabilities. This implies that; 
"The [organization] shall identify the Accountable Executive who, irrespective of 
other functions, shall have ultimate responsibility and accountability, on behalf of the 
[organization], for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS. The 
[organization] shall also identify the accountabilities of all members of management, 
irrespective of other functions, as weU as of employees, with respect to the safety 
performance of the SMS. Safety responsibilities, accountabilities and authorities shall 
be documented and communicated throughout the organization, and shall include a 
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definition of the levels of management with authority to make decisions regarding 
safety risk tolerability" (ICAO, 2009, 8-APP 1-2). 
According to Reid et al (2008), management systems have been demonstrated as important in 
the management of safety performance in the same way that general management systems are 
important in the management of productivity. Leadership, and particularly that of senior 
managers within an organisation, is regularly put forward as a fundamental aspect in the 
success of management systems. 
However, Reid and company, argues that very few studies have be en undertaken conceming 
leadership of safety in organizations. They question among other things, whether safety needs 
to be managed in a different way to other aspects of the business, such as productivity? And if 
there is there a particular leadership st yle for senior managers (e.g. transformational) that 
influences the level of safety in their organizations? (Reid et al (2008). 
There are, however, on going research on leadership of safety in organizations. It does not 
implicit go by that name. This field of studies falls under what is named complex system 
leadership theory. More on the complex system leadership theory will be discussed later. 
Back to the issue of if 'safety needs to be managed in a different way to other aspects of 
business'? There are certainly many ways of answering this question. Briefly, safety doesn't 
have to be managed differently, but one can say that traditional managerialleadership has 
limitations, as regards to safety. 
Schreiber and Carley (2007) argue that traditionalleadership has limited applicability to 
postmodem organizations as it is mainly focused on efficiency and control. Whereas, the 
postmodem organizations has a design paradox in which leaders are concemed with 
efficiency and control, as weU as complex functioning. 
What is known as the organizational design paradox, is that the recognition that while 
organizations need to stimulate emergent collective action, they also have bureaucratic nature 
and a need to efficiently control organizational outcomes for exploitation. Complex 
functioning is the coevolution of human and social capital that results from the interdependent 
interactions among autonomous agents with diverse knowledge. Complex functioning 
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produces leaming and adaption, both ofwhich are needed for effective response in highly 
volatile environments. 
The relationship between managerialleadership and complexity leadership can best be 
described by the figure depicted below. These inc1ude the three entangled leadership roles of 
complexity theory, managerialleadership, adaptive leadership and enabling leadership. 
Managerialleadership is the traditional notion of formalleadership roles with top-down 
control and strategic planning. Leadership st yle is a behaviour that is associated with formal 
leadership roles. Adaptive leadership is leadership that occurs within the interdependent 
interactions of emergent collective action and that helps produce emergent outcomes such as 
leaming and adaption. Adaptive leadership is important to the complex functioning of the 
network. Enabling leadership has two roles. First, it creates conditions that stimulate 
emergent collective action and adaptive leadership. Second, it channels productive emergent 
outcomes originating in the collective action response back up to the managerialleadership 
for strategic planning and exploitation (Schreiber and Carley, (2007). 
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Figure 6.2 The three entangled leadership roles of complexity leadership theory. 
Source: Uhl-Bien et al. (2002) in Schreiber and Carley, (2007 p. 233). 
The bottom line is , "leadership st yle may be important to complex functioning because 
differences in how decisions are made within the organization could affect the coevolution of 
human and social capital" (Schreiber and Carley (2007), p. 229). Naturally, this has 
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consequences for employee's dedication, commitment and participation to the organization's 
strategic intent. 
Safety leadership (in aviation) should therefore, also, entail elements of enabling leadership 
and adaptive leadership. Thus, in order to tackle the challenges in globalization, aviation 
sector as a turbulent market, and stimulate change and commitment for safety efforts. 
6.2. Procedures and policy as a factor in promoting Safety Management System 
Aviation sector is highly respected and reckoned for its routines conceming procedures. An 
illustration is the book "Why Hospitals Should Fly - The Ultimate Flight Plan to Patient 
Safety and Quality Care". The book is about how the health care system can leam from 
aviation safety. However, it is interesting that other sectors such has railway, hospitals, 
nuclear plans have implemented SMS, but in the aviation sector, this is a new thing. This is 
not to say that safety programs have been missing in aviation. 
Safety policy is one of the four pillars of SMS. The others pillars are safety risk management, 
safety assurance, safety assurance and safety promotions. According to the ICAO SMS 
framework, safety policy and objectives is composed of five elements: 
o management commitment and responsibility 
o safety accountabilities 
o appointment of key safety personnei 
o coordination of emergency response planning 
o SMS documentation 
One of the main purpose ofthe safety policy, is that it should actively encourage effective 
safety reporting and, by defining the line between acceptable performance (often unintended 
errors) and unacceptable performance (such as negligence, recklessness, violations or 
sabotage), provide fair protection to reporters. The SMS documentation is the Safety 
Management System Manual (SMSM), is meant as a key instrument for communicating the 
organization's approach to safety to the whole organization. It documents all aspects of the 
SMS, including the safety policy, objectives, procedures and individual safety accountabilities 
(ICAO, 2009). 
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Figure 6.3 Procedures and policy as a promoting factor for SMS. (Percent) N=31 
The results from the respondents show that 42 percent regard procedures and policy as very 
important, 39 percent as important. However, 19 percent are uncertain. The average score for 
all the answers is 4,2 on a scale from 1-5. It is the third highest score for factors regarded as 
important for promoting SMS implementation. 
6.3. Training and recurrent training as a factor in promoting Safety Management 
System 
Training and recurrent training is a requirement that is regulated in aviation. However, 
training comes with a cost. 
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Figure 6.4 Training and recurrent training as a promoting factor for SMS. (Percent) 
N=31 
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35 percent regard training and recurrent training as very important, while 45 say this is 
important. 19 percent are uncertain. The average score for all the answers is 4,1. This is the 
fourth highest score for factors regarded as important for promoting SMS implementation. 
Safety promotion, as presented earlier, is one of the four pillars of SMS. According to the 
ICAO SMS framework, safety promotion is composed oftwo elements: 
o Training and education 
o Safety Communication 
Conceming Training and education, "The [organization] shall develop and maintain a safety 
training programme that ensures that personnei are trained and competent to perf orm the SMS 
duties. The scope of the safety training shall be appropriate to each individual's involvement 
in the SMS". As re gards to Safety communication, "the [organization] shall develop and 
maintain formal means for safety communication that ensures that all personnei are fully 
aware of the SMS, conveys safety-critical information, and explains why particular safety 
actions are taken and why safety procedures are introduced or changed" (ICAO,2009 p. 8-
APP-1-3). 
From a complexity perspective, it is essential not to forget history. The comprehension ofhow 
people in the system have been trained is vital. Here, an important aspect is input. The 
organization has to have inputs the whole time to keep it functioning. Thus, it becomes a 
leaming organization. 
6.4. Bu.siness objective as a factor in promoting Safety Management System 
Business objective as defined earlier is the "positioning and actions taken by an enterprise, in 
response to or anticipation of changes in the extemal environment, intended to achieve 
competitive advantage", or in short strategy. Business objective in the ICAO context is 
referred to as 'production goals'. Meaning, decisions on how the delivery of services is made. 
Figure 6.5 show that 71 percent of the responses regard the business objective as an important 
or very important factor for implementing SMS. However, 26 percent are uncertain of 
whether the business objective is either important or not, while a 3 percent regard that it has 
little importance. The average score for all the answers is 3,9. 
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Figure 6.5 Business objective as a promoting factor for SMS. (Percent) N=31 
The business objective or strategy of the airline operators and service providers in the aviation 
industry has never been more challenging, in order to survive. The low-cost carriers (LCC) 
such as South West, Ryanair, Norwegian have created a highly competitive market situation. 
The international financial crisis that has been going since 2008 is another issue. 
Globalization and the deregulation of the industry are among many other things. 
The business strategy can, however, conflict with the employee's interest. An example is from 
an internet article where an anonymous pilot working in Norwegian, meant that Ryanair has 
become a role model for modem airline and that the work hour in Norwegian is a threat to 
safety. Åsa Larsson, Head of information-Norwegian, responded in the same article that they 
look at costs to compete with companies in Europe and emphasized that: 
"Strategy is a management responsibility. It is not the employees who set the company 
strategy" 
(det er ledelsen i selskapet, og ikke flygerne, som skal utforme selskapets strategi. 
"Piloter Advarer Mot Norwegian" 2012) 
Studies show that having a clearly defined and communicated strategy is crucial and vital for 
any implementation, if not business survival. Therefore, it is an important enabler. 
According to the ICAO SMM or EASA's basic regulation, "the management systems shall 
correspond to the size of the organization and the nature of the complexity of its activities, 
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taking into account the hazards and associated risks inherent in these activities" (ICAO, 2009; 
EASA, 2012). This means that the SMS should be an integrated part of the business objective 
or 'production goals. 
6.5. Organizational strudure as a fador in promoting Safety Management System 
Organization structure, here relates to how tasks and people are specialized and divided and 
how authority is distributed within the organization. In the aviation, managerial positions are 
regulated. These are regulated positions that must meet certain regulatory requirements and 
must be in place to get an Airline Operators Certificate (AOC) or a license to operate. This 
means that an organization cannot be approved if key positions are vacant and that for certain 
positions, one must pass tests arranged by the civil aviation authority. However, organizations 
are free to structure their organizations and even, to some extent, work titles. In other words 
"there will be as many organizational charts as organizations may exist in aviation" (ICAO, 
2009, p.8-7) 
Safety accountability is what ICAO relates to when referring to how SMS should be 
organized. According to ICAO, the safety accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities of 
all departmental heads and/or persons responsible for functional units, and in particular line 
managers, must be described in the organization's safety management systems manual 
(SMSM) (ICAO 2009). 
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Figure 6.6 Organizational structure as a promoting factor for SMS. (Percent) N=31 
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Figure 6.6, the results from the respondents show that 52 percent regard organizational 
structure as important, 26 percent as very important. However, 19 percent are uncertain. The 
average score for all the answers is 4. 
6.6. Safety Culture as a fador in promoting Safety Management System 
Gill and Shergill (2004), describes that the relationship between safety management systems, 
and safety culture has been discussed extensively in the safety literature ofhigh-tech and 
high-risk endeavours induding aviation. 
Culture can be described in the simplest terms as a "collective programming of the mind". 
Culture influences the values, beliefs and behavior that we share with the other members of 
our various social groups. Culture binds us together as members of groups and provides dues 
and cues as to how to behave in both normal and unusual situations. Culture sets the rules of 
the game, or the framework for all our interpersonal interactions. It is the sum total of the way 
people conducts their affairs in a particular social milieu and provides a context in which 
things happen. In terms of the management of safety, understanding culture is as important as 
understanding context, since culture is an important determinant of human performance 
(ICAO, 2009) 
The greatest scope for creating and nourishing an effective, generative culture for the 
management of safety is at the organizationallevel. Operational personnei in aviation are 
influenced in their day-to-day behaviour by the value system oftheir organization. Does the 
organization recognize safety merit, prornote individual initiative, discourage or encourage 
safety risk tolerance, enforce strict SOP compliance, tolerate breeches of SOPs or promote 
open two-way communications? Thus, the organization is a major determinant ofthe 
behaviour employees will engage in while performing operational activities that support the 
delivery of services for which the organization is in business. Organizational culture sets the 
boundaries for accepted operational performance in the workplace by establishing the norms 
and limits. Thus, organizational culture provides a comerstone for managerial and employee 
decision-making: "This is how we do things here, and this is the way we talk about the way 
we do things here." Organizational culture then consists of shared beliefs, practices and 
attitudes. The tone for an effective, generative organizational culture is set and nurtured by the 
words and actions of senior management. Organizational culture is the atmosphere created by 
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senior management which shapes workers' attitudes towards, among others, safety practices. 
Organizational culture is affected by such factors as: 
a) policies and procedures; 
b) supervisory practices; 
c) safety planning and goals; 
d) actions in response to unsafe behaviour; 
e) employee training and motivation; and 
f) employee involvement or "buy-in". 
The ultimate responsibility for the establishment and adherence to sound safety practices rests 
with the directors and management of the organization - whether it is an airline, an 
aerodrome, an ATS or an AMO. The safety ethos of an organization is established from the 
outset by the extent (ibid) 
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Figure 6.7 Safety culture as a promoting factor for SMS. (Percentage) N=31 
Figure 6.7 indicates that safety culture is clearly recognized as an important enabler for SMS. 
The average score for all the answers is 4,7. It is also the second highest score for factors 
regarded as important for promoting SMS implementation. 
An effective safety culture produce a belief that when safety and production goals conflict, 
managers will ensure that safety will predominate (Hollnagel et al. 2012). 
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6.7. Software management as a fador in promoting Safety Management System 
According to ICAO (2009), aviation organizations are oftentimes described as "a system of 
systems". This is because aviation organizations must develop, implement and operate a 
number of different management systems to achieve their production goals through the 
delivery of services. Typical management systems an aviation organization might need to 
operate include: 
a) quality management system (QMS); 
b) environment management system (EMS); 
c) occupational health and safety management system (OHSMS); 
d) safety management system (SMS); and 
e) security management system (SEMS). 
Figure 6.8 show that 41 percent of the respondents are uncertain of the importance of software 
management as an enabler for implementing SMS. However, 28 percent regard it as 
important, a 16 percent see that it has little importance, a 3 percent see it as very important 
while a 3 percent see that it has no importance at all. The average score for all the answers is 
3. 
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Figure 6.8 Software management as a promoting factor for SMS (Percentage) N=31 
At first, I thought that probably the question was unclear. After second thoughts, I came to the 
conclusion that this does not necessary have to be the case. This can be because, it is an area 
often considered an issue for the IT -department or computer experts. Furthermore, it is not 
one ofthose subjects often discussed as a safety issue. However, the optimal use of the 
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information and how we update this information in our management system is a central issue 
here. 
According to ICAO, there is a developing tendency in civil aviation to integrate all these 
different management systems. There are clear benefits to such integration: 
a) reduction of duplication and therefore of costs; 
b) reduction of overall organizational risks and an increase in profitabi1ity; 
c) balance ofpotentially conflicting objectives; 
d) elimination of potentially conflicting responsibilities and re1ationships; and 
e) diffusion of power systems. 
ICAO states that aviation organizations shou1d be encouraged to integrate their quality, 
safety, security, occupational health and safety, and environmental protection management 
systems. However, "this integration is presently beyond the scope of the harmonized ICAO 
safety management" (ICAO, 2009 p. 7-12). 
6.8 Standardization as an inhibiting facfor in Safety Management System 
How is standardization conceptualized as an inhibitor in system safety? According to 
Stephans (2004), this has to do with that there is the lack of standard terms, basic tools, and 
techniques. Stephans uses a toolbox as a suitable analogy. Ideally, the system safety manager 
or engineer has well-stocked too1box of ana1ysis types and techniques and is able to study the 
particular task at hand and select the appropriate too1 or combination or tools to perform the 
task effective1y and efficiently. He argues that, what ifthere were no "common" too1s? 
Examp1e, what if each box contained a completely different set of too1s in a mixture of 
standard, metric, and unique sizes and even the names of the too1s were different? Thus, 
because no common too1s or common names exist, specifying tools or training mechanics - is 
almost importance. That means; each individual mechanic becomes familiar with certain tools 
and generally ab1e to se1ect something that will work, but that competence does not alleviate 
the problem. Since, each time we have to change mechanics, we must retrain them. Stephans 
stretches that in the real world of system safety, the problems are even greater (Stephans, 
2004). 
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In system thinking, it is not comp1ete1y correct to conceptua1ize a system as a too1box. This 
brings about the issue that has been illustrated above. Which not on1y puts into question how 
certain types of work, assessments and app1ications are performed, depending on who does 
the task. 
It is therefore wrong from a system point of view the examp1e of what a SMS is as found in 
the ICAO SMM, where it is stated that: 
"An SMS is the too1box, where the actual too1s emp10yed to conduct the two basic 
safety management processes (hazard identification and safety risk management) are 
contained and protected. What an SMS does for an organization is to provide a 
too1box that is appropriate, in size and comp1exity, to the size and comp1exity of the 
organization" (ICAO, 2009 p. 7-1-7-2) 
SMS is a management too1 for decision making. 
Figure 6.9 shows that 39 percent of the respondents regard that standardization is a very 
important inhibitor for imp1ementing SMS. However, 29 percent regard it as an important 
inhibitor, a 26 are uncertain of standardization as arestraining factor, and 6 percent regard 
that it has on1y of 1itt1e importance as arestraining factor. The average score for all the 
answers is 3. 
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Figure 6.9 Standardization as inhibiting factor in SMS (Percent) N=31 
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6.9 Resources as an inhibiting fador in Safety Management System 
Resources can be divided into four main categories. These are human, financial, technical 
and time. Hollnagel (2009), emphasizes that time because of its special character warrants 
that it is treated separately. 
The perspective of the management of safety as an organizational process and of safety 
management as a core business function c1early places ultimate safety accountability and 
responsibility for such function at the highest level of aviation organizations (without denying 
the importance of individual safety responsibility for the delivery of services ). N owhere are 
such accountability and responsibility more evident than in decisions regarding allocation of 
resources. The resources available to aviation organizations are finite. There is no aviation 
organization with infinite resources. Resources are essential to conduct the core business 
functions of an organization that directly and indirectly support delivery of services. Resource 
allocation therefore becomes one of the most important, if not the most important, of the 
organizational processes that senior management must account for (ICAO, 2009). 
The competition in the allocation of resources can lead to a management dilemma that has 
been dubbed the "dilemma of the two Ps". Simply put, the "dilemma of the two Ps" can be 
characterized as the conflict that would develop at the senior management level of the 
organization because of the perception that resources must be allocated on an either/or basis 
to what are believed to be conflicting goals: production goals (delivery of services) or 
protection goals (safety)(ibid). 
The perfect situation is a balance between the resource allocation on safety management and 
production costs. According to ICAO, regrettably, the history of aviation shows that effective 
resolution of the dilemma has not been commonplace. They say what history shows is a 
tendency for organizations to drift into an unbalance in the allocation of resources because of 
the perception of competition between production and protection. In cases when such 
competition develops, protection is usually the loser, with organizations privileging 
production objectives (albeit introducing numerous caveats to the contrary). Thus, the results 
are being businesses ending up in catastrophe. On the other end, the bias in the allocation of 
resources is towards the protection side of the balance, thus leading to bankruptcy. Although, 
this alternative is hard to find in the annals of aviation history, it nevertheless alerts one to the 
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importance of sensible organizational decision making regarding allocation of resources 
(ibid). 
Financial obligations are monitored by the Civil Aviation Authority. That can be one 
explanation that it does have to been a catastrophe to go bankrupt but that the authority 
withdraw the Airline Operation Certificate (AOC), and therefore eliminating that process. 
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Figure 6.10 Resources as inhibiting factor in SMS. (Percent) N=31 
Figure 6.9 shows that 42 percent of the respondents regard that lack ofresources is a very 
important inhibitor for implementing SMS. However, 36 percent regard it as an important 
inhibitor, a 16 are uncertain of lack of resources as arestraining factor, and 6 percent regard 
that it has only of little importance as arestraining factor. The average score for all the 
answers is 4.1. 
6.10 Authority regulations as an inhibiting factor in Safety Management System 
This item could have titled communication. Much of communication that leads to different 
forms of operation in the aviation is an authority responsibility. But aviation authorities 
through implementing rules set out the 'play field' . However, the same regulations have been 
adapted different as nationalleveis. The key word here could have been communication. 
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Three reasons behind naming the question as authority regulation: 
- Different national interpretation and practices of ICAO or JAR requirements 
- This implies different procedures and level of 
- Often leading to new terminologies with different meaning than how the markets conception 
of the term. 
An example is the adaption of Safety Management System in EASA's Basic requirement. 
"Regarding ORA.GEN, a majority ofreactions (87 out of93) were made to Section Il 
'Management system', which reflects the volume of AMCs and GM provided in this 
section. Some of the reactions repeated NP A comments claiming that the EASA 
proposal on safety management systems (SMS) did not weU align with the applicable 
ICAO provisjons." (EASA, 2012). 
The Section Il 'Management system' in the Organization Aircrew is to a great extent on 
Safety Management System. Interesting here is that, of the 93 reactions that EASA received 
on the section, only 4 of the reactions was not related to SMS. The point I am trying to make 
here is that is that requirements agreed upon in an organization. In this case ICAO, is 
conceived or interpreted as different when implemented by an authority, in this case EASA. 
This is EASA response to the critics: 
"Although different in wording, the proposed management system requirements and 
related AMCs as weU as relevant essential requirements set at the level of the Basic 
Regulation are fully compliant with the ICAO framework. Within Part-ORA these 
provisions are presented in away that fits various orgarnzations, whatever their size, 
nature or complexity of the activities and whatever business model they wish to apply, 
thus ensuring their proportionate application" (ibid). 
Figure 6.11 show that 39 percent ofthe respondents regard authority regulations as a 
important inhibitor for implementing SMS. However, 29 percent are uncertain on the issue of 
indicators as arestraining factor. 16 percent regard it as an important inhibitor, and 6 percent 
regard that it is of little importance as arestraining factor. The average score for all the 
answers is 3,5. 
62 
Very Important 
Important 
Uncertain 
LiUle important 
Not Important 
--,------_. 
o 10 20 30 40 50 
---_._-_ ..... _--------- ._--~._-- ._----------_._-------------------_._._-----.-------_ ... ----.---- .•. ' ------- - - - ----.-. __ .-.-.------~----_. __ ._._._----_._-_._----
Figure 6.11 Authority regulations as an inhibiting factor in SMS. (Percent) N=31 
6.11 Indicators (risk assessment) as an inhibiting fador in Safety Management System 
Stephans (2004), argues that the problem with risk assessment codes RAC), unfortunately, go 
beyond the lack of standardization. The RAC should provide a valid basis for determining the 
acceptability of risks, prioritizing risks, and allocating resources to reduce risks. According to 
Stephans, most RAC matrices use scales that are so subjectively and poorly defined as to be 
virtually meaningless. Furthermore, he argues that in many cases the severity scales are too 
restrictive and the probability scales too broad (Stephans, 2004). 
The variation in the different approaches to risk assessment is a critical issue not only for the 
reporting on the level of risks. It can undermine the development of reliable safety indicators. 
Figure 6.12 show that 45 percent of the respondents regard indicators (risk assessment) as a 
very important inhibitor for implementing SMS. However, 23 percent regard it as an 
important inhibitor, a 23 are uncertain on the issue of indicators as arestraining factor, and 6 
percent regard that it is of little importance as arestraining factor. The average score for all 
the answers is 4,1. 
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Figure 6.12 Indicators (risk assessment) as an inhibiting factor in SMS. (Percent) 
N=31 
6.12 Quality data and information as an inhibiting factor in Safety Management System 
Quality data and information as inhibitor in SMS implementation implies the lack of 
systematic cataloging and uniform methods of data analysis. This includes reporting routines. 
Stephans (2004), states that, even though considerable data exist, they are not necessarily 
available or in the correct format. He argues that, a well-organized effort to identify and 
catalog existing databases and develop plans for the systematic collection and dissemination 
ofnew data would benefit the entire safety community (Stephans, 2004). 
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Figure 6.13 Quality data and information as an inhibiting factor in SMS. (Percent) 
N=31 
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Figure 6.13 show that 45 percent of the respondents regard lack of quality data and 
information as very important inhibitor for implementing SMS. However, 23 percent regard it 
as an important inhibitor, a 19 are uncertain on the issue of Quality data and information as 
arestraining factor, and 3 percent regard that it is only oflittle importance as arestraining 
factor. The average score for all the answers is 4,2. 
6.13 Human Factors as an inhibiting factor in Safety Management System 
Woods et al (2010) distinguishes the stages in system safety approach by what they call as 
first stories which implies the traditional way and the new by what they eaU second stories. 
Table 6.1 The contrast between first and second stories 
First stories Second stories 
Human error (byany other name: Human error is seen as the effect on systemic 
violation, complacency) is seen as a cause vulnerabilities deeper inside the organization 
offailure 
Saying what people should have done is a Saying what people should have done does not 
satisfying way to describe failure explain why it made sense for them to do what 
they did 
Telling people to be more careful will Only by constantly seeking out its vulnerabilities 
make the problem go away. can organizations enhanee safety 
Source: Woods et al (2010:7) 
65 
Very Important 
Important 
, 
Uncertain I 
'c 
Uttle important 
Not 1m portant Il 
o 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Figure 6.14 Human factors as an inhibiting factor in SMS. (Percent) N=31 
Figure 6.14 show that 48 percent of the respondents regard human factors has a very 
important restraining factor for SMS implementation while 32 percent regard it as important. 
10 percent is uncertain of human factor as an important restraining factor. 6 percent, however, 
regard that it has little importance. 3 percent of the respondents regard that it has no important 
all. . The average score for all the answers is 4,2. 
6.14 Software lrnowledge as an inhibiting fador in Safety Management System 
According to Stephans (2004) argues that, what it is not generally recognize in the system 
safety community, is that there are no safety problems in system design. He explains that, 
there are only engineering and management problems, which if left unsolved, can result in a 
mishap. 
Figure 6.15 show that 39 percent ofthe respondents are uncertain of the importance of 
software management as an inhibitor for implementing SMS. However, 29 percent regard it 
as important, a 13 percent see that it has little importance, and another 13 percent regard it to 
have no importance all, while a 6 percent regard that it is a very important inhibitor. The 
average score for all the answers is 3. 
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Figure 6.15 Software knowledge as an inhibiting factor in SMS.(Percent) N=31 
6.15 Safety Management System relevance to all sectors in aviation 
This question is closely related to the question on knowledge of SMS. Although the question 
may se em obvious, actually, two of the respondents did not bother to answer it. I have at least 
four reasons for including this question. 
1. There are voices, especially from the General A viation (GA), who argue that SMS 
implementation would be too resource dernanding, and that their main activities are on 
a hobby basis. Therefore, SMS is not appropriate or relevant to them. 
2. Those who are use to Quality Management (QM) or Cornpliance Monitoring (CM) to 
use EASA's terrninology, reckon that it is a good enough system for safety. 
3. As mentioned about, this topic is related to the question on knowledge. My opinion is 
that, only by having a good knowledge of SMS, makes it possible to see its relevance. 
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Figure 6.16 Safety Management System relevance in aviation. (Percent) N=29 
Figure 6.16 show that 83 percent ofthe respondents strongly agree that SMS is relevant in 
aviation. While 14 percent agree that it is relevant but there is a 6 percent who disagree that it 
is relevant in aviation. The average score of all the answers is 4,7. 
6.16 Knowledge of Safety Management System in aviation 
The intention of having this question was to tind out how those with knowledge of and those 
without knowledge of SMS, rated the importance of the promoting and inhibiting factors. 
However, due to the small sample and that the majority of the respondents rated themselves to 
have very good or excellent knowledge of SMS, makes impossible to draw any conclusion, 
whether knowledge of SMS makes a difference in how these factors are rated. Although, 
based on the results presented earlier. It would not be wrong to say that, with good 
knowledge of SMS; the higher one would rank the factor as an enabler or an inhibitor. 
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Figure 6.17 Knowledge of SMS in aviation (Percent) N=31 
Figure 6.17 show that 90 percent of the respondents meant that they had good to excellent 
knowledge of SMS, (39 percent as excellent. 35 percent as very good and 16 percent as 
good). The average score of all the answers is 4. 
6.17 Summary 
The findings from the data analysis show that safety leadership and safety culture are 
regarded as the most important prornoters for SMS implementation. From a scale from 1-5, the 
average score for 'Safety Leadership' is 4,8 and 4,7 for 'Safety Culture'. Interesting is that 
Software management with the average score of 3. This indicates that either the respondents were 
uncertain about the question or the importance of Software management as a promoting factor in 
SMS implementation. Among the inhibiting factors, both the average score for 'Quality Data and 
Information' and 'Human Factors' was 4,2. The interesting result is that among the ranking of 
inhibiting factors, 'Resources' was not rated as the most important inhibitor. The average score 
for 'Resources' was 4,1. However, the difference is very small. 'Software Knowlegde' had the 
lowest ave rage score of 3, among the restraining factors. 
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Chapter 7 ICAO's Phased approach SMS implementation 
In this chapter, I will present ICAO's phased approach implementation strategy. This 
approach is an example ofhow an organization can implement its SMS. 
7.1 Phased approach implementation 
For a SMS implementation not to turn out to be a completely daunting task. ICAO 
recommends a phased approach to SMS implementation. Meaning the implementation 
process should be divided to different set of phases/stages. The phased approach to SMS 
implementation includes: 
Phase l: Planning SMS implementation. 
Phase 2: Reactive safety management processes. 
Phase 3: Proactive and predictive safety management. 
Phase 4: operational safety assurance. 
Phase l: Planning SMS implementation. This involves a blueprint on how the SMS 
requirements will be met and integrated into the organization' s work activities, and the 
accountability framework for the implementation ofthe SMS. 
Firstly, this is done through, basic planning and assignment ofresponsibilities establishment. 
Secondly, what is central to Phase l is the gap analysis. From the gap analysis, an 
organization can determine the current status of its safety management process and can begin 
detailed planning of the safety management processes. 
The elements based on the ICAO SMS framework that should be finalized at the completion 
ofPhase 1 are: 
a) Identify the Accountable Executive and the safety accountabilities of managers. 
b) Identify the person (or planning group) within the organization responsible for 
implementing the SMS. 
c) Describe the system (approved training organizations that are exposed to safety 
risks during the provision of their services, aircraft operators, approved maintenance 
organizations, organizations responsible for type design and/or manufacture of 
aircraft, air traffic service providers and certified aerodromes). 
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d) Conduct a gap analysis of the organization's existing resources compared with the 
national and international requirements for establishing an SMS 
e) Develop an SMS implementation plan that explains how the organization will 
implement the SMS on the basis of national requirements and international SARPs, 
the system description and the results of the gap analysis. 
f) Develop documentation relevant to safety policy and objectives. 
g) Develop and establish means for safety communication. 
Phase 2 - Reactive safety management processes. 
The objective of Phase is to implement essential safety management processes. Most 
organizations will have some basic safety management activities in place, at different levels 
of implementation and with different degrees of effectiveness. These activities may include 
inspections and audits reports, analysis of information from accident reports and incident 
investigations, and employee reports. This phase aims at solidifying existing activities and 
developing those which do not yet exist. However, because forward-Iooking systems have yet 
to be developed and implemented, this phase is considered reactive. Towards the end ofPhase 
I, the organization will be ready to perf orm coordinated safety analyses based on information 
obtained through reactive methods of safety data collection. 
The elements based on the ICAO SMS framework that should be finalized at the completion 
ofPhase 2 are: 
a) Implement those aspects of the SMS implementation plan that involve safety risk 
management based on reactive processes. 
b) Deliver training relevant to the SMS implementation plan components and to safety 
risk management based on reactive processes. 
c) Develop documentation relevant to the SMS implementation plan components and 
to safety risk management based on reactive processes. 
d) Develop and maintain formal means for safety communication. 
Phase 3 - Proactive and predictive safety management processes. 
The objective ofPhase III is to structure forward-looking safety management processes. 
Safety information management and analytical processes are refined. Towards the end of 
Phase Ill, the organization will be ready to perf orm coordinated safety analyses based on 
information obtained through reactive, proactive and predictive methods of safety data 
collection. 
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The elements based on the ICAO SMS framework that should be finalized at the completion 
of Phase 3 are: 
a) Implement those aspects of the SMS implementation plan that refer to safety risk 
management based on proactive and predictive processes. 
b) Develop training relevant to the SMS implementation plan components and to 
safety risk management based on proactive and predictive processes. 
c) Develop documentation relevant to the SMS implementation plan components and 
to safety risk management based on proactive and predictive processes. 
d) Develop and maintain formal means for safety communication. 
Phase 4 - Operational safety assurance. 
Phase IV is the final phase of the SMS. In this phase operational safety assurance is assessed 
through the implementation of periodic monitoring, feedback and continuous corrective 
action to maintain the effectiveness of safety risk controls under changing operational 
demands. At the end of Phase IV, safety information management and analytical processes 
ensure sustenance of safe organizational processes over time and during periods of change in 
the 
operational environment. 
The elements based on the ICAO SMS framework that should be finalized at the completion 
ofPhase 4 are: 
a) Develop and agree on safety performance indicators, safety performance targets and 
SMS continuous improvement. 
b) Develop training relevant to operational safety assurance. 
c) Develop documentation relevant to operational safety assurance. 
d) Develop and maintain formal means for safety communication. 
All the four phases should be completed and finalized in a manner that meets the 
expectations of the civil aviation oversight authority, as set forth in relevant requirements and 
guidance material. 
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7.2 Summary 
In this chapter I have presented a summarized version ofICAO's phased approach 
implementation. This is an approach that an organization can apply in order for a SMS 
implementation not to turn out to be a completely daunting task. 
There are definitely many ways of implementing SMS. However, it seems that this approach 
is not widely known. I also intend to present my own implementation strategy later on. The is 
that I see the phased approach as away only to meet regulatory requirements. 
73 
Chapter 8 Discussion 
The discussion is based on the model of analysis, literature review, findings that have 
emerged from the research results and the current debate on SMS. lintend also to include the 
model of analysis in a larger context by presenting a conceptual model for a successful SMS 
implementation. 
First of all, what is my contribution to existing research in system safety? 
The contemporary system safety literature emphasizes the role of the organization as an 
important factor in developing and keeping a safe system. The authority requirements in the 
ICAO Safety System Manual (SMM) and the European A viation Safety Agency (EASA), 
mandate that Safety Management System (SMS) shall be implemented by organizations in the 
aviation industry. However, as I can see, neither the theories nor studies in system safety, 
include in detail, the vital factors for an organization to survive in a competitive business 
environment. In other words, these factors are in generalized as management, organizational 
processes or production's goals, etc. 
It is worth mentioning that much focus has been on issues of management and culture. 
However, as I see it, the management of and culture in an organization covers very many 
different aspects of an organization. In my opinion, by only concentrating on the two issues, it 
restricts our understanding of other important processes important for the organization 
(system). The 7-s framework for strategy implementation, in my opinion, can be adopted as a 
holistic approach to understanding organizational processes especially when implementing a 
new system. To understand complexity in these processes, a system approach is necessary. A 
system approach implies having a holistic view. 
The sample in the survey conducted was very small. For that reason, it limits the discussion 
based on the research findings. Furthermore, the results cannot be generalized. However, it creates 
a foundation for further studies. An important aspect of the study is that even though the sample 
was relatively small. It is that, a high percentage ofthose who took part in the survey, ranked 
themselves to have either good or excellent knowledge of the SMS in aviation. I regard the 
findings as interesting since it can be used in developing information and leaming on SMS. 
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A topic that I would to mention in the discussion chapter is what I have come through during 
the literature review. These are concepts or definition in official documents that in my view 
are not correct according to Complex systems theory. 
Exampel l: Predictive method according to ICAO. 
"The predictive method captures system performance as it happens in real-time normal 
operations to identify potential future problems" (ICAO, 2009 p. 3-11) 
The point here is that complex systems by nature are unpredictable. So the term predictive or 
able to predict is in this context is hard to understand from a complexity point ofview. 
Exampel2: Manual to EASA on Part ORA. 
EASA has decided that organizations should be categorized as Complex or non-complex 
depending on size. My point here is that all aviations organisations are complex from a 
complexity point ofview. Since open systems are complex. 
These are issues may complicate SMS implementation. 
8.1 Cost-effedive safety 
A way of looking at safety management as an investment in the business activity is 
considering the cost of not having a safety management system in place. Alston (2003) cost 
measurement happens in severai ways, sometimes involving human injury or death, damaged 
corporate image, or lost potential. Routinely, tangible costs reduce to a currency amount. 
When a person dies unnecessarily, the organization faces direct and indirect currency value 
tangibles such as insurance deductibles, training costs and lost production. The intangibles 
include the obvious emotional cost of grief, sadness, and decreased morale that affects the 
organization. They are corporate distractions that accompany grief and low morale impact on 
job performance and in the end production goals (Alston, 2003). However, there are moral 
dilemmas regarding pricing safety costs when it comes to saying environmental, traffic or 
workplace accidents. How do we go about pricing the value of human lives or the 
environment? (Haukelid, 1999). In other words, human lives and the environment can never 
be replaced when destroyed through negligence or accidents. This brings in the issue of 
looking at SMS in a wider context by including the stakeholders. 
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There are certainly many ways ofimplementing SMS. In Chapter 7, I presented the ICAO's 
phased approach implementation strategy. As I can see it, the phased approach is helpful in 
planning SMS implementation as a project, and naturally, it is also a compliance based 
approach. By compliance based approach, I mean that it focuses mainly on regulatory 
requirements and for approval from the authorities. The point I am trying to make here is that 
SMS should not develop to be only aregulatory requirement. This would mean that safety 
continues to be treated separately from organizational process, and regarded as an added cost. 
Forgetting or not realizing that actually one of the main ideas behind SMS is cost-effective 
safety. 
I will now present a model for a successful SMS implementation. The model is adapted and 
modified based on Osarenkhoe (2006). At the top of the conceptual framework are the 
stakeholders. Stakeholder outcomes; are the constant changing expectation and requirements that 
need to be monitored and responded to by the organization. A successful SMS implementation in 
this context means meeting and fulfilling all the expectations from the stakeholders. Safety track 
record and image are important. Letfs not forget that one of the reasons behind the concept of 
SMS, was aresult of the eight commercial accidents in 13 months in the U.S. This was in the 
1990s and it brought about public concem (Stolzer et al., 20 l O). 
The implementation strategy for SMS should be 'safety-centric'. My definition of 'safety-centric' 
is that the system (organization) shall meet all the performance and safety requirements while 
be ing cost-effective. The term is not commonly used in aviation today, but I would encourage that 
it would. My main reason for it is that the motto or slogan "safety-first" is by many regard mere ly 
as a cliche. Even ICAO states in the SMM, that" safety is not the first priority of aviation 
organizations" (ICAO, 2009 p. 3-2). The idea behind this term can be found in Ducas(2007). 
The managerial capabilities required in such an organization is complexity leadership capabilities 
(enabling and adaptive leadership, discussed in section 6.1). The strategic implementation 
framework and the strategic enablers are continuously monitored to deliver the strategi c 
proposition (safety-centric), to the satisfactory of the stakeholders. 
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Figure 8.1 A conceptual model for a successful SMS implementation 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion and future studies 
The question posed for the study is; what inhibits and promotes the implementation of System 
Management Systems (SMS) in aviation? 
Based on the literature review, enabling and inhibiting factors were selected for the study. I 
constructed a model for analysis related to the question, theory and the literature review. The 
model is holistic, and I believe my contribution to existing research is a holistic approach to 
safety system studies. The approach applied in the study is Complexity System Theory. 
The findings show that 'Safety Leadership' and 'Safety Culture' are regarded as the most 
important promoters for SMS implementation. From a scale from 1-5, the average score for 
'Safety Leadership' is 4,8 and 4,7 for 'Safety Culture'. Interesting is that Software management 
with the average score of 3. This indicates that either the respondents were uncertain about the 
question or the importance of Software management as a promoting factor in SMS 
implementation. Among the inhibiting factors, the average score for both 'Quality Data and 
Information' and 'Human Factors' was 4,2. The interesting result is that among the ranking of 
inhibiting factors, 'Resources' was not rated as the most important inhibitor. The average score 
for 'Resources' was 4,1. However, the difference is very small. 'Software Knowlegde' had the 
lowest average score of 3, among the restraining factors. This indicates that either the respondents 
were uncertain about the question or the importance of 'Software Knowlegde' as a inhibiting 
factor in SMS implementation. 
The dissertation recommends that the inhibiting factors should be reasonable targeted. These 
factors have to be attended to since they can seriously affect the implementation of Safety 
Management System. However, the important enablers such as 'Safety leadership' and 'Safety 
Culture' must be taken seriously. Furthermore, a continuous development and monitoring of 
the strategic enabling factors are essential. This is important, since the promoting factors also 
by time need to adapt to the changes in the system, and they can easily become inhibitors. 
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9.1 Future studies 
The sample in the survey conducted was very small. For that reason, it limits the discussion 
based on the research findings. Furthermore, the results cannot be generalized. However, it creates 
a foundation for further studies. An important aspect of the study is that even though the sample 
was relative ly small. It is that, a high percentage ofthose who took part in the surve y, ranked 
themselves to have either good or excellent knowledge of the SMS in aviation. I regard the 
findings as interesting since it can be used in developing information and leaming on SMS. 
Performing such a survey on a larger population or among organization is 
recommended. 
Longitudinal studies for countries and organizations that have not yet implemented 
SMS can be fruitful in the long run. It will then be a better performance indicator. 
Content analysis on the websites such as LinkedIn could present some interesting 
results 
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Safety Management System in Aviation - what inhibits and promotes implementation? Page l of3 
Safety Management System in Aviation - what 
inhibits and promotes implementation? 
Dear survey participant, The aim of this questionnaire is to identify the most common factors that 
inhibits and promotes Safety Management System in Aviation. The reasearch is part of a 
dissertation for my MBA in Aviation Management. 
This survey is purely for research purposes, and the information you provide will be STRICTL y 
CONFIDENTIAL and will be used solely for the purposes mentioned above. No respondents or 
organization's name will be disclosed in the final report. If you have any questions about this 
questionnaire, please contact me at the following address: http://www.Hnkedin.comlpub/ierry-okema-
ooira/32/301/144 or ierryo@online.no 
~Må fylles ut 
Safety Management System (SMS) in Aviation 
1. Rank the following factors on how you mean they are important for you and organization in 
promoting Safety Managemet System 
(1=Not Important; 2=Little Important; 3= 4= Important; 5= Very Important) 
Proeedures and Policy 
and Recurreni 
Business Objectives 
Structure 
Safety Culture 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Rank the following factors on how you mean they are important in restrainingl preventing 
Safety Management system for you or your orgainization 
(1= Not Important; 2=Little Important; 3= 4= important; 5 =Very Important) 
Resources 
!ndicators (Risk 
Assessment) 
Data and 
Human Factors 
1 2 3 4 5 
https://docs.google.com/ spreadsheet/viewform ?formkey=dEotQTBZc V JxR 1 dMb3 pL... 21.12.2012 
Safety Management System in A viation - what inhibits and promotes implementation? Page 2 of 3 
1 2 3 4 5 
Software Knowlegde 
3. Safety Management System is relevant to all sectors in aviation 
1 =Strongly Agree; 2=Agree, 3=Uncertain; 4= Disagree; 5=Strongly Disagree) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree 
BACKGROUNO INFORMATION 
4. What is your core business 
Airline Tr::l,n""""rt I Airline 
Maintenance Engieneering I Airworthiness 
Airport I Aerodrome 
Aviation Authority 
Quality Assuranee 
Safety Service:;; 
General Aviation 
Otner 
5. What is your position in the organization 
CEO 
Manager I Head of Department I Section 
Pilot 
Inspector 
!nstructor 
Air Traffie Coniroller 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dEotQTBZcVJxRldMb3pL... 21.12.2012 
Safety Management System in A viation - what inhibits and promotes implementation? Page 3 of 3 
Maintenance Engineer 
Personell Quality Assurance 
Personell Training 
Safety Officer I Safety Personell 
Flight Examiner 
Cabin Crew 
General AVIation Personell 
Other 
6. How would you rate your knowlegde in Safety Management System (SMS) in aviation 
(1=None; 2=Fair; 3=Good; 4=Very Good; 5=Excellent) 
1 234 5 
None Excellent 
7. Specify your country of main operation * 
THANKYOU 
You have reached the end of this questionnaire. I would like to thank you for taking the time to 
provide your responses 
Please provide any general feedback, question or con cerns 
I Send I 
Drevet av Google Dokumenter 
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